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Opening Remarks, Michael Schiff
Welcome to this session, which for the Ross Institute is 
the third session of this type that we have had this year. We 
have sort of experimented with this mode of discussion and found 
it most desirable. It is the kind of discussion that does not 
have formal papers presented but, instead, addresses issues with 
some variation in structuring before we start and then forces the 
discussion amonst interested parties. The session today is 
jointly sponsored by the Ross Institute and the AICPA’s Commission 
on Auditors’ Responsibilities and addresses the problem of the 
interface between the audit function and various facets of 
capital markets, portfolio management, and investment decision 
making.
You will notice that we have microphones and that the 
proceedings are being taped. We here at the Ross Institute 
will prepare and publish a report from these taped proceedings 
and disseminate it to interested parties. I want to assure you 
that there will be no attribution of comments. I suspect we 
couldn’t do it if we tried. I think I would know what George 
Sorter said and a couple of others—voices I’m familiar with— 
but for the most part I would have great difficulty. I would 
ask you to please note that the microphones are situated
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through the room. We can avoid pushing a microphone around if 
when you speak you speak loud enough so we can hear you across 
the room. If you try to hear this caution in mind, your gems 
will he recorded and we will save ourselves a lot of effort in 
this regard.
We have attempted to structure this session by assigning 
two key topics to he discussed this morning and two this after­
noon. For each of the topics we have asked a person to take the 
responsibility of not presenting a paper, hut rather, in out­
line form, indicating some specific questions. You will receive 
a copy of the outline as we proceed to each of these topics, and 
the individual responsible for the outline will then, perhaps, 
expand on the questions. We will then have it open for dis­
cussion.
Let me briefly outline our arrangements and timing. We 
will have a break this morning. Since we use this room both 
for our discussion and our luncheon, we will cut promptly at 
twelve. We will have refreshments in the nice room next door 
and then return here for lunch. At about 1:15 p.m. we will 
stretch for about fifteen minutes while the room is being 
cleaned up, reconvene at about 1:30 p.m.,and then have a break 
at three o'clock or so of about five minutes, reconvene, and 
cut promptly here at 4:30. I say cut promptly at 4:30 the 
formal discussion. There will be refreshments available at
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4:30. You may stay as long as you want and exchange ideas in­
formally in our refreshment room down the hall.
Now, I would like to turn the meeting over to Doug 
Carmichael, who will chair it for the morning. Lee Seidler, 
who may be delayed, will chair the afternoon session. Again,
I am delighted to have you here. And I turn now to our chair­
man for the morning, Doug Carmichael, whom you all know of course.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET 
THEORY FOR INDEPENDENT AUDITS
Chairman of Morning Session, Douglas Carmichael
During the past several years a lot of
attention has been devoted to research primarily in finance on 
the relationship between accounting information and security 
prices and the earnings generating activity of companies and 
really the relation of all those things to the securities market. 
In the last couple of years, more attention has been devoted to 
the implications of those theories for the development of 
accounting principles. Very little attention, though, has been 
given to the implications of those theories for independent 
auditors and the function of the independent auditor in society 
or in the capital market. So, the purpose of this roundtable 
is to provide a vehicle for exploration of those implications.
We are really not concerned with exploring the validity of the 
various theories or going into great detail on the research 
behind them but are interested in just having a very free-flowing
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discussion on what the implications of those theories are 
for independent auditors.
Now, both of the people that we asked to prepare out­
lines for the session this morning are dealing with the efficient 
market hypothesis. I will pass out the outline Boh Kaplan was 
kind enough to prepare for us and then just turn this over to 
Boh. His discussion is going to he divided between a brief 
background on the efficient market hypothesis and then an ex­
ploration of questions concerning its implications for auditors. 
He has identified a few questions. We don't need to be limited 
to those, but I think we can start there.
Outline: Prepared by Robert Kaplan
I. Background
A. Efficient Market - Market prices fully reflect 
available "information” and, hence, market 
prices react instantaneously and unbiasedly to 
new information
1. Weak Form - "Information” = past sequence 
of prices; autocorrelation studies, filter 
rules, uselessness of technical analysis; 
implication for pricing marketable equity 
securities.
2. Semi-Strong Form - "Information" = publicly 
available information; effect of stock splits, 
secondary offerings, macro-economic indicators; 
anticipation of earnings announcements, effect 
of switching accounting alternatives
3. Strong Form - "Information" * publicly available 
plus insider information; profitability of 
mutual funds, insider trading, segment-
based earnings projections
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B. Portfolio Theory-
Investors should hold diversified portfolios; no 
risk premium for diversifiable (unsystematic) risk, 
linear relation between return and systematic 
risk, Beta (covariance of security return with 
market return) as a measure of systematic risk.
II. Implications of Efficient Markets for Auditors: Some Questions
A. Since prices react instantaneously to new information, 
should the auditor be involved in major company 
announcements to insure that the announcement is 
consistent, free from bias, verifiable,...?
B. Since the market appears to be able to absorb, in 
an unbiased fashion, the financial information 
generated by companies and their auditors, should 
there be a greater responsibility for auditors to 
exercise more judgment in disclosing information?
Auditors have unique and perhaps monopolistic access 
to internal company information not available to the 
general investing public. Should auditors comment 
on the appropriateness of the depreciation method, 
assumed depreciable life of assets, and residual value 
of discretionary expenditures, such as R&D, adver­
tising, and personnel development?
C. Many new disclosure requirements are arising for firms, 
including replacement cost estimates and forecasts.
The market will apparently try to anticipate and 
respond quickly to this information. What should be 
the auditor's role in validating these data and com­
menting on the procedures and assumptions used by 
management to prepare these estimates? This is a 
similar question to the role of the auditor in interim 
statements.
D. (Courtesy of Bob Elliott) If we accept that market 
prices respond quickly to new information, then un­
usual price activity in a stock could be a signal of 
major events affecting a firm. Should auditors main­
tain in real time a market model for all the publicly 
traded stocks of their clients? (A market model 
attempts to explain movements in an individual stock 
by its historic correlation with overall market 
movements; e.g., when the market changes by 5%, the
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stock is expected to change by 6%.) With such a 
market model for each client company, auditors 
could detect when new, firm specific, information 
is being processed by the market. Should auditors 
attempt to discover the nature of this new information 
on an interim basis to perhaps issue a new or re­
vised opinion? Would such unusual price activity 
during a year cause auditors to intensify certain 
audit procedures at the year end audit?
Discussion Leader, Robert Kaplan
A lot of this discussion is based on a paper I delivered
at Duke University back in December, and Doug has seen fit to 
keep me in line by having invited both discussants of that paper 
at that time to this conference, Bob Mautz and Chuck Werner. So,
I am sure that they will be prepared to limit me if I get out of
line here.
Let me just spend a few minutes talking about what the
basic ideas behind the efficient market research are and what
its implications are.
In the outline under Item A, I gave a brief definition 
We mean
of what we mean by a market that is efficient./that it fully 
reflects available information, information which could be 
defined in various forms as shown in the subheadings of 
Item A, and that market prices react instantaneously and un­  
biasedly to new information. There is some question as to what 
we mean by instantaneously. I would say that still it really 
hasn’t been settled, but I would say measured within days, one 
or two days, rather than within weeks or months. It is a matter 
of timing. Unbiasedly means that the market basically understands
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the announcement or the economic event that has occurred and 
it attempts to adjust for that, working out as best it can 
the implications for the future of the economy or for the 
particular stock. It does not mean that the market is prescient, 
that it knows exactly what realizations will occur based on the 
new information, so there is still a lot of fluctuation that 
can occur. But unbiased means that there are no important depend­
encies; the market doesn't systematically overlook implications 
in the information that would enable someone to develop a trading 
strategy based on the time it takes for the new information to 
ripple through the market.
There is a certain model around the street, I guess, 
which says that first insiders or tape watchers get the information 
and certain trades get made on that. Then, the information gets 
down to the brokerage houses, and the brokerage houses convey it 
to their retail customers. It takes a while for the information 
to be disseminated. If that were really true, there would be 
an opportunity for the tape watchers to trade on the information 
as it ripples through all these users, but in fact, we have 
yet to find instances where that has actually occurred. The 
evidence is that, to a reasonable approximation, the information 
is quickly incorporated into current prices—within a day or 
two—and has no important dependencies that remain.
So, there is a variety of studies that have taken place 
on macro events—whether it is announcements of new car sales,
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announcements from the Federal Reserve Board, even announce­
ments of major world events as typified in headlines of news­
papers. The idea is to find out what the speed of adjustment 
to that kind of information is, and again it is within a day, maybe 
two days. It is hard to pin it down exactly. George Benston was 
telling me last night at dinner that the study the people in 
Rochester are doing measured the adjustment time in minutes.
Well, I haven't seen it. It may be true. We are going more to 
time compression rather than to expansion. So, that is the speed 
of response.
The other question is: What type of information Is the 
market using? The first form of the efficient market idea has 
to do with the question: Can the past sequences of prices be 
used to predict future prices? An extreme example of this is 
technical analysis, where people chart the movements of stocks 
over time, try to look for certain underlying patterns. They 
talk about support levels, psychological barriers, all these arcane, 
almost astrological concepts that can take place. The efficient 
market, again, really implies that all the information about 
past sequences of prices is already incorporated in the current 
price and that how it happens to get to the current price is 
irrelevant. All the history from the past prices is already 
contained in the current price, and therefore technical analysis 
is really not a wortwhile—socially worthwhile—activity unless
-9-
you get some psychological pleasure from doing that rather 
than playing chess or playing tennis and other recreational 
activities. There are some implications there for accounting 
policy, particularly in the pricing of marketable equity 
securities, but that is really another story, not what we are 
going to be taking up today.
The more complicated form of the efficient market idea 
has to do with more general types of information, which not 
only include prices but the whole array of information that 
comes out about the economy and about stocks and industry— 
information about the accounting numbers, information about, 
say, new car sales, labor contracts, new oil discoveries, all 
the kinds of specific information that does come out. Again, it 
has been found in a wide variety of studies of this kind of 
information that it is incorporated in the stock price quickly 
and unbiasedly, that the market seems to understand what these 
announcements are and their implications for the future of a 
company or an industry. The specific kinds of accounting studies 
that have come up to look at this have first tried to determine 
the information content of earnings numbers, the role of 
accounting numbers. The paradigm here is that if the market is 
incorporating all publicly available information about the future 
of a company then: Is accounting data relevant to that? Are 
the processes that are gone through by accountants relevant to 
the underlying economic events of the firm? So, they
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try to determine whether there is some correlation between the
earnings announcements and movements in stock prices. It turns
out that that is not a trivial task because the market forms
expectations about what the earnings should be. Therefore,
having an earnings number which says the earnings are $3.40
and trying to see whether the stock price was expected by having
that earnings announcement, depend upon how that $3.40 compares
to what the market had expected earnings were going to be in
that period. So, one has to build models as to expectations
about what the market expected earnings would be and then make
judgments as to whether that particular earnings announcement
was either good news, so the stock would go up, or bad news,
in which case the stock might go down. Well, these models have
been built, and, to summarize, the studies in this area show that if one
knew the earnings announcements a year in advance or if one
knew quarterly earnings announcements, say, 3 months in advance,
one could develop a trading strategy that would enable you to
outperform the market. So, there is some information content
in the earnings numbers that is consistent to some degree with
the underlying economic events of the firm. Those findings
gave us all comfort that we were not doing something irrelevant.
Another set of studies had to do with the question:
Is the market fooled by the particular types of accounting 
conventions that firms use? I might contrast the efficient
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market idea with its polar extreme—which is the stupid market, 
perhaps, concept—and I come to think of it as the price-earnings 
ratio fixation. That is, the view that each company is somehow 
given a price-earnings ratio in the market, however determined, 
and then anything that a company can do to increase its earnings 
will then immediately translate to an increase in price because 
the same price-earnings ratio will be applied to those earnings 
regardless of how those earnings were generated. And so companies 
that switched from accelerated depreciation to straight line 
depreciation for financial reporting and therefore increased 
their reported earnings by 20% would be able to get,at least 
or at most perhaps, a 20$ increase in their stock prices as 
investors kind of lost track as to where that extra 20$ of 
earnings came from and applied the same price-earnings ratio.
To see whether companies are able to increase their stock 
prices by switching accounting policies, we have examined the 
depreciation issue—to switch from accelerated to straight line— 
and the switch in inventory policy. I have recently completed 
a study on whether using pooling of interests rather than purchase 
accounting in mergers tends to increase the stock price of 
acquiring companies. We have been unable to find any real
evidence to the effect that companies are able to increase 
their stock prices by use of an accounting convention whose 
effect is to increase their reported earnings. Remember, in
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something like the pooling vs. purchase issue, when there is 
a merger, there is a proxy statement; there is full information 
disclosed about the acquiring firm, about the acquired firm.
One could compute the book value of the acquired firm and deter­
mine the value of the securities that the acquiring firm is 
giving up—the market value. So, even if that merger was treated 
as a pooling of interests, there is plenty of information for 
people who, if they wanted to feel that the purchase method was 
the correct method to use, could figure out what the goodwill 
was in that merger, divided it by 40, and make an annual charge, 
if somehow they felt that was appropriate. So that is the kind 
of data on which the, say, semi-strong form has been tested, 
basically alternative accounting policies and then certain other 
events of a firm as I have indicated in the outline—stock splits 
and secondary offerings. The evidence is consistent with an
efficient market.
Now, we have kind of drawn all these implications from 
these studies, assuming that the market is efficient with respect 
to all available information. We have not really tested it on 
very complicated types of information processing—the kind of 
things that a sophisticated financial analyst might do taking 
annual reports and really doing projections as to future revenues 
and costs, publishing that information, and seeing whether 
such an analyst is able to affect the stock price based on the 
analysis of publicly available information. There have been
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some studies as to following the advice of brokerage houses 
to buy and sell, and basically you find that brokerage houses 
don’t outperform the market. You find that whatever information 
they have is already incorporated in the current stock prices.
The second major idea is portfolio theory—and I guess 
Marty Gruber will talk about that this afternoon—but it is 
just that we feel that the investors should hold diversified 
portfolios, which means 20 or 25 securities at least. By doing 
that, a lot of risk which they would be exposed to if they only 
held 2 or 3 securities could be diversified away, and the only 
risk that they are left with is the risk of what the overall market 
is going to do. And that is a risk that you can’t get away from 
once you hold those types of securities—equity securities. You 
can hold securities that go up less when the market goes up and 
consequently go down less when the market goes down. But the 
idea is to hold diversified portfolios, given that the market is 
basically efficient and securities are fairly priced with respect 
to available information, and don’t spend a lot of time and money 
trading out of that portfolio—paying transactions costs. In 
effect the buy-and-hold strategy will work quite well or as well 
as most any other and perhaps better than an active trading 
strategy in giving you an overall rate of return.
In summary here we can say that even for the naive in­
vestor, who doesn’t understand all the footnotes in financial
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statements, the naive investor is facing a basically fair game. 
This is somewhat analogous to how I learned thermodynamics.
The first law of thermodynamics says that you can’t lose because 
there is conservation of energy. The second law of thermodynamics 
says that you can’t win—that is the law of entrophy; you can’t 
get all the energy out in the form you want it in. The efficient 
market, the efficient market idea says, first, that you can’t 
win—you can’t turn abnormal returns based on analysis of publicly 
available information or trading on past sequences of prices, 
but, if you hold diversified portfolios—and if you don’t have 
enough capital to do that on your own—use an instrument like 
no-load mutual funds, then you don’t lose too badly. You don’t 
lose. You are still facing a fair game, if for whatever reason 
you are holding securities, you still manage to hold a diversified 
set of them and don’t spend too much of your capital paying the 
stockbroker and trading on them.
Now, the direct implications of these ideas have been 
clear to me for accounting policy—and that 3s really the subject 
of another talk—and Doug has asked me to try to think about 
what are the implications of the efficient market idea for 
auditors. And that is something I had not thought about very 
much and even after I thought about it some, was hard pressed 
to think of many ideas. I suspect perhaps the most interesting 
idea, which I put in as Item D, was one that, when I finally 
thought about how I ever got that idea, I remembered Bob Elliott
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suggested it to me and I even dug out the letter when he wrote 
it to me. So I had to acknowledge his help on that.
I guess Items A and C are basically the idea that since 
the market is responding quickly to new information and is trying 
to Incorporate new information into current security prices, 
should the auditor be involved with major company announcements, 
so that, in effect, the market is operating on data that you might 
call harder, less subject to bias and manipulation by management? 
Would there be any advantage of having the auditors involved with 
major company announcements, or reviewing them, so that as the 
market processed this data, you could have more confidence that 
the data were prepared in a reasonable and fair manner? So, in 
Item A I just mentioned any major company type of announcement— 
a new contract, a new discovery, labor negotiations. Item C is 
really the more traditional role of the issuance of financial 
information, such as replacement cost estimates and forecasts of 
future earnings, of which the market should be inclined to in­
corporate in its estimates of the value of the firm. What is the 
auditor’s role in these types of disclosure?
As to Item B—let me try to make a little more sense out 
of what I was getting at there—I think I was addressing the 
sophisticated user and that is, that the market, on the margin, 
has prices set by sophisticated users who seem . to be incor­
porating all the available information In security prices. So, 
rather than worry about how to make the current 10 or 12 page
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financial statement simpler for the naive user, I think the 
message of the efficient market is that, well, the naive 
investor is already facing a fair game, and the question for 
auditors is, how can we make the game even fairer or increase 
the prospect of better allocation of resources by supplying 
more information that might be relevant in the setting of 
security prices?
Perhaps we should use the auditor as the vehicle for 
getting more information out to the market, for example, rather 
than Just deciding whether the depreciation policy is consistent 
with GAAP, perhaps, the auditor should decide whether it is 
reasonable for the company or whether the depreciation lives 
are reasonable for those assets. An example of this, I guess, 
is the IRS proposal that airlines amortize their airplanes over 
12 years rather than 6 years. For those of us that fly, we 
spend a fair amount of our time flying on 707s which are probably 
fully depreciated; yet we still fly on them, which means that 
they are getting some economic use out of them. So perhaps 
some of the lifetimes that companies are assuming may be too 
short; maybe they are too long. It is hard for the general 
public to get a feeling for this. Auditors do have unique 
access to the information. Should they really get involved in 
trying to get a better estimate of some of these subjective quan­
tities? This again will create much greater demands on the 
auditors because it is not just deciding whether a particular 
mechanical procedure is consistent with the set of mechanical
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procedures that are allowable but whether that mechanical procedure 
is appropriate for the underlying economics of the firm. And 
that requires more knowledge about the firm and the use of their 
assets in the course of business.
Item D says that the market is really responding very 
quickly to new information. So, maybe the auditor should try 
and figure out what information is there, so that the auditor 
does not consistently overlook a relevant piece of information 
when the audit is conducted. Or, if there has been a change in 
some assumption that the auditor made in the last audit report, 
the auditor perhaps should discover this and issue a revised 
opinion or withdraw the opinion that was last issued. So that 
if all of a sudden, the stock had dropped 20 to 30 per cent, 
there clearly must be some new information about the value of
the assets of that firm, the long-term assets or perhaps the 
inventory, and it may be possible that the auditor should try 
to find out about this.
The idea here is that the auditor would keep track of 
the market prices of the firms and try to detect when there has 
been unusual price activity in a stock and then try and determine 
what is causing that unusual activity. This means unusual activity 
over and above the market. If the market drops 20% and a stock 
drops 20%, you know that that is a statement about overall economic 
conditions and forecast about the future, a general not a specific 
thing. But if the market had dropped 5% and that particular stock
-18-
had dropped 30%, then somehow the market is receiving information 
that says that a security is really worth much less than I had 
previously thought and may call into question some of the asset 
valuations that had formerly appeared on the balance sheet, and 
that may give a signal to the auditors to find out what has 
happened and to determine whether that would cause them to change 
their opinion about this company since their last financial state­
ments .
That is kind of a brief overview of the ideas as best as 
I can make it as to what implications the efficient market might 
have to auditors.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Chairman (DRC): Now, I suppose the easiest thing to do 
would be to take several of these in order, starting with the
first.
Discussion Leader (RK): Yes, if there are any questions 
about No. 1, which is the efficient market...
Chairman (DRC): After that comprehensive explanation, 
how could there be questions?
(LL): On your one, we were not supposed to challenge the 
basis or even get into it, but I am curious. Have there not been 
instances in history which have indicated that the market has 
been carried away by itself—tulip bulbs in Holland?
Discussion Leader (RK) : Well, the tests that have been 
done have been done on the equity market, on the New York Stock 
Exchange securities basically since 1930 or 1933, and it is not 
a statement that goes back in history to the tulip bulbs thing.
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One of my colleagues did a study about prices of greenbacks
in the Civil War, which were issued by the North, showing how 
the prices of that really fluctuated very much with the success 
of the Union Army and could identify the turning points, and 
the same idea of risks and portfolio models shows that it was 
consistent with that kind of model, even though they didn’t 
have computers and never heard the words regression or Beta.
(LL): Getting back, you know, to a little more recent 
history, was the market completely efficient when institutions, 
say, bid up the price of the magic 50 or the growth stocks 
with enormous high multiples that don’t seem to be existing 
any more?
Discussion Leader (RK): You get a lot of stories about 
things like this, two-tier, three-tier market, or the conglom­
erates, where ex post it seems like the market was wrong.
Remember the fact that the market is efficient doesn’t mean
that it is prescient, otherwise we wouldn’t have much fluctuation 
in prices. It is hard to know what the expectations were about 
the future growth In the economy and future inflation rates.
Changes in the rate of growth of a firm affect growth stocks 
much more than nongrowth stocks. One can build simple finance 
models that talk about the value of the firm as a function of
the increase in growth in the dividends. A reduction of the 
growth rate of 20% can have severe impacts on what we call high 
flyers, high RE multiple stocks. So, changes in that expectation of
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growth can have really substantial impact on the top 50, the 
high-growth stocks, much more than on the low-growth stocks.
As we hit the oil embargo, became more conscious of limited 
or higher cost of raw materials, then we could have revised 
our expectations about what growth could be expected and 
that would cause a re-evaluation back down. One could think 
of explanations that would be consistent with the market price 
at that time, that would be consistent with the efficient 
market idea, but other people could also say: ’’Well, the 
market was stupid; it is obvious that the prices of those 
securities could not be supported by the underlying funda­
mentals."
(LL): Only one other question. This gets close to
accounting. You mentioned that the research had touched on 
purchase vs. pooling, and I presume that is under the new 
rules. Did you go hack to the middle and late sixties?
Discussion Leader (RK): Well, no, we went back and 
looked at mergers which took place between 1954 and 1964.
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(LL): Did you really? I have always believed that 
there were instances where the public was pretty badly fooled 
about the price that a company paid for an acquisition which 
was treated as a pooling.
Discussion Leader (RK): We didn’t look from ’65 to ’72, 
which is when many of the typically larger poolings occurred.
But given that we didn’t find anything from ’54 to ’64, one 
would have to argue that somehow the market forgot how to keep 
track of poolings later after it was doing a good job the previous 
ten years. As far as the price that they paid, that is another 
story. There is some evidence that the way you make gains is 
to own a company that was being brought out, not to be the 
company that was doing the buying. There were gains associated 
with owning a stock which was acquired by another firm, but, 
you know, the pooling vs. purchase idea is that somehow the 
acquiring firms could get higher stock prices or higher rates 
of return, because they were understating their true earnings 
by use of poolings. We looked and couldn’t find it.
(CW): You have got a little bit of a bias on most 
purchase vs. pooling studies, because inherently the companies 
that tend to have purchase after purchase after purchase are 
the stronger companies to begin with. As I recall some of 
what you told us down at Duke last year, it is a little bit 
hard to take that kind of a factor out of those studies.
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Discussion Leader (RK): But it is interesting that 
certainly those companies don’t seem to he hurt by the use 
of a purchase method with an amortization. So, that if I 
had to choose one set of companies whose stock prices seemed 
to go up with the merger, it was the purchase one, perhaps 
because they were the stronger ones.
(KJ): Bob, could I ask a question? I'm a little 
confused by the term efficient. Does efficient merely mean, 
as it is used in the title of this theory, does it mean 
merely that the information is absorbed, or that the response 
is a proper response?
Discussion Leader (RK): Both. Instantaneously and 
unbiasedly is where the fault lies.
(EH): How do you decide whether a reaction is 
unbiased?
Discussion Leader (RK): Well, you have to have some 
prior model as to whether a piece of information is an im­
portant economic event with the firm. For example, a stock 
split with no change in dividends is one that we consider not 
an important economic event. It would really be surprising to 
find that the market placed a higher value on securities that were
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selling at $30 a share rather than $90—previous set—at 
$90 a share. In fact you find just that; the market is 
basically indifferent to a stock split. This gets into a 
lot of examination of the details of the studies, and how 
it was tested, and it is obviously a hard thing to construct 
situations where one can have strong prior feeling as to what 
the appropriate or unbiased price of stocks is and then see 
whether in fact that was realized on average by companies.
But I think that would get’ us involved in another discussion.
(EH): Except that it is very very important to an 
understanding of the theory to know—and I’m not proposing 
that you go any deeper than you feel that you want to—but 
it is extremely difficult to understand the significance of 
the theorem, unless one understands especially this matter of 
bias, as to how that is judged.
(JR): Is it correct to say, Bob, that...unbiased
relates to the reflection of information available from 
whatever source in the market? But now if you assume that 
some sources are costly to seek out, I have a question in my 
mind whether that costly information to seek out is in fact 
reflected depending on the cost of seeking out the information. 
In that case, unbiased, in the empirical sense at least, would 
mean that prices only reflect the information that was sought 
out by the market, and I suspect there is no way to empirically
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find out whether all information was sought out, including 
information that was costly. In that case, I think this may 
have some different implications to the discussion that follows.
(MG): There is a very practical definition of unbiased­
ness which is simply that you can’t make money by trading on 
the information. Not necessarily that an adjustment is right 
at any instant in time, but there is as likely to be an over­
adjustment as there is an underadjustment in any moment in time 
So the point comes up where the simple trading rule, such as 
when a company has earnings — reports earnings—which are higher 
than last period’s earnings, buy. That type of rule does not 
lead to excess returns. Not necessarily again that the market 
adjusts with no variance, adjusts perfectly, but it doesn’t 
really adjust in one direction.
(CW): Yes, but you see, you haven’t done any studies
that concentrate on those situations where there is a confluence 
of the thing like hot stock and hot accounting, like franchising 
6 years ago. You haven’t concentrated on a study just of that 
kind of thing.
Discussion Leader (RK): Well, there are lots of in­
formation that the market uses to set security prices, and it 
has only been tested on a subset of those, perhaps a small and 
simple subset. I try to at least make that clear in my survey 
article. We expect that the market does a fairly good job even
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on the more complicated kinds of information, though there 
may he anomolies. I’m not prepared to say that I know for 
sure that when all is said and done 10 or 20 years from now, 
that it will have worked on all these kinds of processing of 
information, hut I think it shifts one’s beliefs. One can 
no longer believe that the market is really stupid and it 
only concentrates on earnings per share and that it therefore 
reacts to anything you can do to affect earnings per share, 
depending on how it is classified. Based on the smoothing 
studies that Joshua has worked on, one would think differently 
about that kind of view of the market. One would think that 
the market is more sophisticated than just responding in a Pav­
lovian fashion to earnings per share announcements, that is 
that it is conditioned about what the price-earnings ratio 
is and will automatically increase prices as earnings per 
share increases by whatever means. So, if there are market 
inefficiences with respect to data, it will be of a fairly 
complex form and very complex interpretation of publicly 
available data.
(HK): Commenting again on Mr. Werner’s example of the 
franchising company, fast food companies, it was amazing during 
the early years of those companies that they went to the market 
recording income almost entirely from franchise fees, which 
obviously had to come to an end sooner or later, and little or 
nothing from operating income. Now, was the market efficient
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when it sold those stocks at big prices and couldn’t evaluate 
the net income—the quality of that income?
Discussion Leader (RK): We are much smarter ex post
than we are ex ante. It is easy to see that what happens is
that there is competition and firms enter and that you don’t
want a franchise store—carry out food store—on every street 
you know,
corner in the United States. But,/you don’t know where the high 
stock price is coming from. One would think that the market 
was there responding to the earnings growth caused by franchise 
sales. A similar thing happened with computer leasing companies. 
Now, how much of their earnings growth was caused by just the 
purchase of assets and its impact through the investment tax 
credit, so that you got growth in earnings just because they 
were purchasing equipment? Now, was the market really fooled 
by that, thinking that was an operating sustainable income?
Again, the casual evidence is that it was. It has not been 
tested, and there is always the danger of looking ex post at 
a few of the more spectacular reversals of stock prices and 
saying that the market was really foolish and not realizing 
the great mass of transactions which basically did a reasonably 
good job. Any process with uncertainty is going to be something 
in detail. If you, ex post, select those and say that was 
really evidence the market was stupid, you are guilty of some bias
-27-
(HK): You realize that there are a considerable number 
of cases of what you call anecdotal evidence, which the market 
seems to have been inefficient in recent years.
(MS): I think we are still struggling with the definition 
of efficient. Can we come back to our definition?
(LL): Is there a question of the efficient analysis of 
false information, which gives you a false answer, although 
there is an efficient analysis?
(JR): Maybe it is important in all this to at least 
recognize that all the evidence is really on the average. We 
are talking about empirical aggregated data on many companies.
So, there may be a lot of anecdotal evidence about 1 firm, 2 
firms, 10 firms, here and there, different points in time.
The empirical evidence which exists with respect to unbiased 
efficient response is really an aggregate evidence. Now this 
doesn’t really necessarily mean—and I don’t think that any 
of the research conducted so far has borne this out—doesn’t
necessarily mean that there wouldn’t be some individuals fooled 
in the process of adjustment, some individuals whose wealth was 
transferred to others of a short-term fashion. Now eventually, 
the market will win because there will be enough sophisticated 
analysts, sophisticated investors who will process information, 
not necessarily the information that is presumably false inherent 
in the accounting reports—which Is a foolish, kind of fooling
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hypothesis—not necessarily process it, but the investors who 
are sophisticated will go to other sources of information and 
process them correctly. Eventually the market will reflect 
this information unbiasedly, quickly, but in the process it 
may well be that some individuals will be adversely affected.
(GS): Plus, Bob, isn't it true that as you stated— 
just as an aside, but it is important here—if you could predict 
income correctly, I mean next year's income correctly, after 
some naive prediction model of what you would expect income to 
be and there is a difference that you can make money? So, I mean, 
efficient market doesn’t say that you necessarily predict, that 
it is necessarily an all-knowing predictor. That is not implied 
by the efficient market.
Discussion Leader (RK): No, as I said, it is not 
prescient. The question that comes up is—it really gets back 
to franchise stock, computer leasing stock, the conglomerates— 
was the market really being foolish? Was there some model, or 
conversely, is there some model of rational expectations or 
beliefs that was consistent with the stock prices of those 
firms, so that it was only subsequently—as subsequent economic 
events occurred—that people realized that the securities were 
worth less than they had previously been set? So it is not the 
poor processing of information but an initial processing which 
gave a certain price and new information which came out which
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caused the revaluation. Well, it is very hard to measure 
that because it is really very hard to know what the information 
set is at any given time and what causes revaluation. It is 
especially challenging, with the hindsight of 5 to 10 years, 
to look back and pick out the most spectacular reversals and 
say that well, it should have been obvious. In a way that is 
kind of what happened to auditor that got caught on an Issue 
like fraud for a company that goes bankrupt. At the time that 
they were doing it, it kind of looked okay, and it was acceptable 
We don’t look at the great 90-98 percent of the companies where 
in fact that was okay. If you go back and look at the 1 or 2 
percent that turned belly up, you say: ’’Well, that was obvious; 
the auditor was stupid to have missed that.” I am just wondering 
whether we are doing the same kind of analysis. We are much 
smarter at the end of a detective story than at the beginning, 
and it is obvious what the clues were all through. We just kind 
of missed them though as we were reading it.
(CW): You point out one interesting thing that has 
severe implications for us. We get sued on specific cases 
not on the average.
Discussion Leader (RK): Let me ask George to give me 
some support here, or perhaps other evidence or theories to 
make sure I’m doing a good job on this.
(GB): I was just going to put to you a question on some
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anecdotal evidence. What do you think of a stock that is
selling at 20 times earnings and then 5 times earnings, fluc­
tuates in that sense, selling for $100 and then $30 and then 
hack up again? You can look through the stock pages of the 
last several years and find stocks where there is no question 
that the accounting is everything anyone would want it to be, 
yet they have fluctuated. IBM, General Motors, those where 
there is a tremendous amount of information, and there is no 
question about the accounting ”fooling the public” in some sense. 
Why do they fluctuate so greatly? The answer is basically that 
the future is extremely difficult to predict, and all kinds of 
things change one’s expectations of the future. It often comes 
to the point where we see a certain thing and we look at it ex 
post and say, ”ah, it is because of the accounting.” The evidence 
is that the accounting information that is produced has very 
little to do with it. It has to do with people trying to estimate 
a very uncertain future. Surely the franchising stocks were a 
bad idea when they go down but a lot of people thought that they 
wouldn’t...I live in Rochester, and everyone used to run around 
saying ”we could have bought Haloid before it became Xerox and 
been millionaires” and now they are running around saying "we 
could have sold Xerox” and so on. The point is that we don’t 
know what the future is like and it is very difficult to estimate 
it. The evidence we seem to have is that the accounting data
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that are produced by accountants have not terribly much to 
do with people being able to predict it.
(JR): George, are you saying that earnings have
nothing to do with prediction of the future?
(GB): I'm saying that I don't know evidence that
they do.
(JR): Well, earnings affect market prices. That we
know.
(GB): I have no evidence that says that is true.
You are objecting, in other words, to the
evidence that Bob was just discussing.
(GB): No, he didn't say that. I don't believe.
Discussion Leader (RK): Well, I said that if you know 
earnings a year in advance, that will help you tell about 
stock prices.
(GB): That isn’t the same as saying earnings affect 
market prices. If anything, market prices affect earnings.
Discussion Leader (RK): No, the fact that you know 
earnings a year in advance and that enables you to develop 
a trading strategy to make money doesn’t say that the in­
formation that eventually gets into stock prices is solely 
due to the release of the earnings reports. There is other 
information which the earnings report is correlated with 
so it is hard to pick out what the unique contribution of
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earnings is vs. all the other information that comes out about 
a company and its industry. George is perhaps taking a harder 
line on this than I would.
(GB): Well, I am suggesting, for example, that his­
torians don’t cause wars.
(JR): No, hut historians predict; accounting historians,
I think, try to predict also the future. And I think earning 
numbers do have an element of prediction and interpretation 
of future events.
(GB): That is a testable hypothesis. I know of no tests 
that support that.
(JR): Yes, I think it is consistent with the Ball and
Brown finding, it is consistent with the Ball, Brown and Gonedes 
work, and it is consistent with many others.
(GS): Let’s take your analogy of the historian, because 
it seems to me that the purpose of auditors’ statements and 
accounting information in general ought to be to serve as a 
filter or as a mechanism that allows one, as new events come 
around, as something happens in the economy or the industry, 
to use the history of the firm, the relationship of significant 
things in the firm which are contained within financial statements , 
to interpret or to translate this industry or economy happening 
in terms of its significance towards the future of a particular 
firm. In other words, that accounting, instead of being a value
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thing or whatnot, serves as a filter, as a relationship that 
says, "this happens, we know this happens in industry right 
now, this happens in the economy.” Now what we are interested 
in clearly, is, what is the impact of this on the future of a 
particular firm? Now it seems to me accounting statements, 
properly looked at, can serve as a way to assess the significance 
of something that is happening for the future of a particular 
firm. This is a somewhat different notion than what we have 
been thinking about accounting statements in the past. I think 
that would make sense in terms of the efficient market literature
(DRC): What does that imply for the auditor? Should the 
auditor be concerned then with the framework and continue to 
finely tune the framework or should he move up to the new 
information prior to its release?
(GS): Okay, let me answer this, because I have some 
specific comments, in Roman numeral II, where I think the ideas 
that Bob has generated are good. However, I would say they 
are much—given my theory, if you will—there are much simpler 
ways of dealing with them. For instance, Item A: Since prices 
react instantaneously to new information, should the auditor 
be involved in major company announcements to insure that the 
announcement is consistent, free from bias, verifiable, and so 
on? That would be almost impossible it seems to me; however, I 
think, given the efficient market framework and given my idea 
on the role of financial statements, what you ought to insist
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on is a postaudit of these types of announcements, that is, 
to make them a part of the achives of the firm and then compare 
them to the actual things that happened, so that when a new 
announcement—in other words, a track record of announcements 
of this type—so that then when a new announcement comes along 
the public is better able to assess the credibility and the sig­
nifiance of those announcements, those new announcements and 
therefore their significance for the firm. In other words, it 
seems to me that it would be very difficult to audit the 
announcement prior to issuing it. However, it should be less 
difficult to maintain some sort of track record that allows the 
investors later on when a new announcement comes along to assess 
the significance and validity of that announcement.
(EH): May I ask how that could be? How could it be more 
difficult to reach a conclusion about information before the 
information is issued than it is to reach a comparable conclusion 
about that information after the information is issued?
(GS): Well, of course, it is a very simple thing to take 
a—you know, say, a president talks to a society of financial 
analysts and makes certain statements which are his beliefs, 
and so on—well, how do you audit that?
(EH): That is my question, but my question also is:
How can you do it any better later than before?
(GS): Well, later on, you could say that he said that 
sales would go up, did sales go up? He said that this would
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happen, did it happen? Those types of things I think are 
easier to do.
(EH): You don’t need an auditor to judge whether sales 
went up.
Discussion Leader (RK): Ex post, the guy may have made 
made his best estimate and those things didn’t get realized.
I would hate to hold them accountable for every statement they 
made. It seems to me that what I was getting at there is that 
if the president gets up there and says "sales are expanding 
in all our lines of business" perhaps, the auditor should see 
what was the evidence that enabled the president to make that 
statement. Was it- really all the lines of business or maybe 
five out of eight?
(GS): But wait, I’m not assuming. Let me just finish 
this. I’m not saying hold them accountable in the sense that 
if they were off target, they were wrong. But, just for in­
stance, if it is revealed, I would guess, that people have 
different sorts of character traits—some are optimistic,
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some are pessimistic, and they tend to he consistent about 
these things--if you reveal those sorts of tendencies, 
if the chronicle or history of the firm shows that a certain 
management is generally optimistic or pessimistic, all in 
good faith, you know, then that is useful information. Let 
me just extend that to Item B, where again it seems to me— 
how do you test realizable lives? One of the simpler 
things that could be done, I would guess, to remedy the 
effect of Item B is for financial statements to show the extent 
of fully depreciated assets on hand. Well, to the extent that 
you have fully depreciated assets on hand, there is prima 
facie evidence, I would guess, that there was some error in— 
some wrong estimate. If some firms have a great deal of fully 
depreciated assets on hand, I think that would be useful in­
formation in order to... Chuck, you don’t agree?
(EH): I don’t disagree with that. Go ahead Chuck.
(CW): The thing is that in the real world, you know, 
they have all got fully depreciated assets, running to 
millions and billions of dollars, and a lot of the reason 
for that is the change in the maintenance expense cycle which 
occurs over time and at varying price levels.
(GS): I’m not even making a judgment. I’m saying that 
it is easier for the user to assess, for instance, the 
significance of heavy retirements in a given year, knowing 
that there are a great deal of fully depreciated assets on 
hand versus not knowing. In other words, I’m sure that they
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all have fully depreciated assets on hand, hut I’m also sure 
that they don't all have the same proportion of fully 
depreciated assets. I am not saying that they were wrong;
I’m saying that the disclosure provides information that 
allows, positively allows, better prediction, if we are going 
to use this as a framework for prediction.
(EH): Could I come back to a point that George made?
This matter of comparing the outcome of a forecast, which is 
what you were talking about—comparing the outcome of a 
forecast—with what the president said from time to time.
Now I think that the implication was that it was the auditors 
who were going to do that. Also, the implication in Item B and 
all through Section II of the outline is: What should the 
auditors be doing? It seems to me that what we ought to be 
talking about first is: What information is useful to 
investors? It seems to me that, on the particular matter 
of comparing the forecasts with the eventuality, fine, 
that can be done. Also, if there should be a section of 
information, not necessarily financial statements, in which 
that kind of information is presented, that is a requirement 
that could be created. But then it seems to me that we move 
as a second step, or should be moving as a second step, 
instead of jumping as an initial conclusion, to the 
question of whether it is useful, appropriate, practicable for
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auditors to be involved in that process. I’m not jumping 
to a conclusion that auditors shouldn’t be involved in any 
particular process. I am objecting to what I see and hear 
as a tendency to move directly from the notion that certain 
information should be presented to a conclusion that it should 
be the auditors who present it.
(GB): That is not the conclusion here; I don't 
believe. It is a statement of: If the market is efficient, 
would these things be worth considering? I don't think there 
is any conclusion that I sense.
(EH): Well—even in raising the question—the question 
is raised in terms of whether it should be the auditors who do
the presenting.
(JR): I think that is the auditor's function, really, 
if you accept the premises (1) that the market is efficient 
in that it adjusts to information unbiasedly and efficiently, 
(2) that at the same time the market is not prescient, (3) that 
there are possibly certain kinds of information that are not 
really available immediately to the market, and (4) that 
the firm has some information that it can usefully make 
available to the market. I view the auditor’s function
primarily as being an information source on the reliability of 
such information. The firm can disclose information, but the
auditor’s function—this I view also as a social benefit of
an auditor’s function—is providing information on the
reliability of that information. Of course, the information on 
reliability of the information provided by the firm can
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presumably be obtained from other sources as well, but it may
be too costly. Now, it seems to me that the auditor's social 
function is exactly to come up with a social arrangement 
that provides a relatively cheap source, relatively cheap 
compared to other social arrangements, to provide information 
on the reliability of information.
(EH): Would you add "within the limits of practicability"
(JR): Yes, I would always add that. What that means 
really...
(EH): That is all I would like to hear.
(JR): When you are saying "within the limits of 
practicability" that means when the cost of doing that is not 
too high.
(MFC): That is not the last word for me. I don't know 
what "within the limits of practicability" means. We do have 
the concept of "auditor of record" and the suggestion here 
that if the information is important it should go out promptly 
and that the auditor can contribute some sense of reliability.
Does all this mean that he should be there all the time and
should have some role with respect to all kinds of financial 
information that may be put out by a company during the year?
(JR): Look, there is a cost/benefit to all of this, 
and clearly there is a limit, not in the sense of practicability
(MFC): That is a flash word, too.
(JR): Well, it is difficult, really, to come up with 
an a priori assessment. Where should the auditor stop being
involved? Clearly, if at least you look at it from a macro-
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social viewpoint, there is a limit to...
(MFC): I understand. I guess the first point of 
analysis would be to determine whether this group believes 
that a benefit, a real benefit, would be provided and then,
I suppose to make some attempt to measure that as against the 
cost of providing it.
(JR): Yes, I think Item B is correct, but it doesn't go as 
far as to specify what should be the criterion for this. So,
I think the criterion should be added, and that criterion is 
prediction. In other words, I think that is what is missing 
here because I agree with Item B completely. Where auditors can 
be helpful—given their relative comparative advantage in being 
close to the firm, familiar with the firm—in providing infor­
mation disclosed by the firm is to have as an objective, in 
choosing among accounting alternatives or others, to enhance 
predictive ability.
(MFC): Are you saying forecasting is useful? Do you think
that it is equally useful to have a major involvement in 
forecasting by auditors?
(jr): Yes, I do, because I don't think firms have 
incentives on their own to provide always correct forecasts.
(MFC): Do you mean that they are affected by a bias?
(JR); Yes, I think they are biased in the case of 
negative information; they will provide, I think, good and
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correct forecasts about positive information that has positive 
implications to their stock returns, but they will not have 
such an incentive to do that with respect to negative 
information. It seems to me that this is where the role 
of the auditor should be. most apparent.
(MFC): This is a suggestion, I guess, which is 
consistent with the recently withdrawn proposal of the SEC. 
Once you get into forecasting, you can’t get out.
(GB): I want to make several points, speaking to 
George Sorter’s point but also on this. There was a study 
done in England on the bias in forecasts, several studies 
as a matter of fact, and they all show that companies tend 
to underforecast rather than overforecast.
(GW ): That’s the English bias.
(GB): Yes, there is a bias in the sense that if things 
turn out to be better than you predicted everyone is happy 
but if they turn out to be worse than you predicted then you
are at fault.
(MS): There is evidence on that score in internal 
divisional budgeting and planning methods in which there is 
a similar tendency to understate in order to achieve.
Discussion Leader (BK): I actually wanted to mention 
that in the outline. I think that the point George raised 
relates to Item D in the outline, the item that Bob Elliott 
suggested. I think that this is one that creates a paradox.
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The question of auditing the company's announcements
would give rise to something perhaps in the auditing
statement, something like this: "We have audited the
financial announcements of this company, and we find that 
the president has lied three times, has spoken rather loosely 
four times, and has been fairly decent five times.” I think 
very few auditors would want to sign a statement like that, 
and, indeed, there is a question as to whether the market, 
that is people who have a profit interest in trying to determine 
that, don’t do it better and faster than the auditor could do 
it. But this gives rise in my mind to another aspect, which is 
why I tied it to Item B in the outline. Look, auditors 
might want to do this, might want to monitor—audit—these 
announcements for a different reason. They might want to do 
it to find out whether the audit ought to be concerned with 
the veracity of the management with which the auditors are 
dealing. If you find a situation in which management is 
constantly—or, at least, appears to be constantly—making 
misleading statements, this is a management that the auditor 
might want to be very careful about and to go considerably 
further in terms of the audit than otherwise. Therefore, the 
auditor might find it in the auditor's self-interest to 
audit an announcement by this kind of an outfit so that he 
could get some sort of an insight as an auditor into the 
firm that he is dealing with, particularly insight into the 
management.
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(LL): I think you do. You can always get an 
example to prove whatever you want to prove. For example, 
we have had one situation in which probably within two 
weeks of knowing what the earnings were going to finally 
be, the chief executive officer, unbeknownst to anyone else 
within the official ranks of top management, made an announce­
ment of what the earnings were going to be, although everyone 
knew that the estimate was too high. It caused us a tremendous 
amount of trouble because his lieutenants began to try to make 
his predictions come true. So, instead of taking two weeks, 
it took about a month to fight that battle out. We finally 
won the battle and lost the account. There are some, I 
suspect, some instances of irresponsibility, but I don’t know 
how many. What has been the experience of other auditors 
and maybe you, Bill? Would you say that announcements are 
generally made with a pretty good reasoning process or on 
a fairly reliable basis?
(WW): I would say this is one of the things that they
think that the market is very efficient about. They think 
that it sizes up the tendencies of the companies, and they 
know—have an idea of—who tends to be optimistic and so on. 
There are patterns. I think that there is a basic bias toward 
making positive type forecasts. You don't find too many 
forecasts when we are going into a business recession that
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say, well, ”we think earnings are going to be down 40
percent this quarter” or something of that sort. They
might indicate that things aren’t so good, but they won’t 
make as specific and definite forecast on the down side, as 
they will on the up side. As Manny said, the SEC Proposal, 
which was something that we proposed to the Federation, was 
to make companies establish a forecasting system. I think 
that over a period of time that would make forecasts more
credible.
(MFC): I would like Just to carry this point of bias 
a little further. Has it been your experience that there is a 
greater bias in a favorable, optimistic forecast as against 
one which is negative or, in other words, a tendency to limit 
a forecast on the down side, but to be a bit too optimistic on 
the high side?
(WN): Well, I think that on the down side the turn comes 
so rapidly in a business recession and the deterioration takes 
place so quickly that the businessman doesn’t realize how 
quickly something is happening. That was certainly true of this 
last recession. So, in that sense, the forecasts that were made 
at the time—I don't know how many there were—probably did not 
state the full extent of the decline in inventories and so forth 
So this is not a question of forecasting bias; it is maybe more 
a question of lack of knowledge.
Discussion Leader (HK): I had a student who did a 
dissertation which looked at releases of company forecasts,
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and he found that they were pretty good in both directions.
I don't think that you would find a bias one way or the
other, whether the forecasts were good news or bad news.
Again, it depends on what you mean by bad news. But I
would say that, given that they chose to issue a forecast and 
that they said earnings were down below the previous year, 
say, you would find that that was basically an unbiased 
estimate, that they were not consistently underestimating 
the decline in earnings.
Let me get back—focus back—on these issues. It seems 
to me that Items A, B, and C are really talking about two 
different things. One issue concerns the auditor getting 
involved with validating currently available and released 
information, such as interim reports or forecasts or any 
other statements made by company officials. In this area, it 
was pointed out that perhaps there is this cost-benefit analysis and 
the question is: How do we know whether it is worth getting 
involved? I guess the more basic questions is: What is the
incidence of managers issuing either misleading forecasts
or sloppily prepared statements just speaking off the top
of their heads without having factual content behind them?
If the incidence of that is fairly low, which means that 
a few—a couple of—percentage of the time, maybe even less,
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there will be managers who issue misleading statements and 
sloppy statements, then I would say there is no pressing 
need to have auditors get involved in that.
The point Chuck made is that you don’t get sued 
on your portfolio of clients, you get sued on individual 
clients. That is true, but I think it is hard to change the 
legal system. I don’t want to be accused of the naivete of 
saying that they are wrong. But from the evidence we have, 
people should hold diversified portfolios so that their 
economic fortunes are not vitally tied to one or two 
securities. If we make a judgment that, on average, it is 
not worth auditing everybody on these continuing release 
of statements because we use up too much resources in doing 
that relative to how much we save for the 1 or 2 percent that 
do issue misleading statements, that is a social judgment, and 
we shouldn't then go off and say to auditors that you should 
have done it. That would still be a judgment. I don’t 
know what the incidence is of what we might call false 
or misleading statements or sloppily prepared statements — 
which is not to say in a pejorative sense that managements 
were evil—but just that they didn't think very carefully.
The second point raises the question: What is the 
auditor’s role in disseminating new information that 
perhaps is not currently available? The kinds of things that 
I talked about in Item B really gets into business 
judgment, not necessarily just financial statement judgment. 
What is the effectiveness of the company’s R&D program or
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their advertising and personnel programs? How well are
they using assets which are carried on the hooks at zero value?
(HJ): Bob, haven’t you got a mixed hag in Item B, 
particularly the last portion? Isn’t there a difference in 
something such as—take the first two items—appropriateness 
of depreciation method and appropriateness of depreciable life?
We have been told—and I accept it—that auditors presently 
have a definite responsibility with regard to the depreciable 
life of an asset but not with regard to the depreciation method 
used. There are many similar things, and I think you could add 
to your list here. But in one case you are talking about, perhaps, 
items that involve the real world, economic reality. For 
example, how long will an asset last? But you are also 
getting into allocation problems here.
Discussion Leader (RK): Well, I had in mind here 
perhaps even a diversion from currently accepted depreci­
ation methods. Many assets probably depreciate slower than 
straight line. So, if you take present value, the discounted 
cash flow concept of the value of an asset, then as I learned 
from David Solomons, you might want to use an annuity method, 
which is an increasing depreciation charge rather than a 
steady depreciation charge or a declining depreciation charge, 
to value the expiration of service on that asset over time. Even 
though the asset we are most familiar with, our cars, depreciate as 
soon as we drive them out of a showroom, many assets don’t depreciate
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that quickly, at least for company use. They decline slower; 
straight line depreciation may he too conservative for 
that company or may he too high a charge in the early years 
of the assets. Do we want auditors to make those kinds
of judgments?
(DRC): I'm afraid to open up the discussion on 
accounting methods. I have observed that there is a great 
tendency to want to he accountants and not auditors, for 
some reason. I think I agree with Ernie’s comment that we do 
seem to he leapfrogging a little too much. The first question 
is: Would it he desirable to present this information? There 
is no need to pin that on the auditor as the starting point.
I would like to explore a little further the movement 
of the auditor up to—closer to—the time of the release of 
the data. We have talked about the basic implication of the 
efficient market hypothesis. The idea that the market 
responds to information quickly leads you to the first step 
in saying that it might he a good idea to get the auditor 
involved. You offered one criterion—kind of a rough 
cost-benefit allocation—for further judging whether that
would be desirable. You look at whether the information is
in fact misleading, whether misleading information is getting 
issued. That is also on the demand side. It speaks to the 
question: Is there a demand for the service? I think there
are probably several other dimensions, other than demand. I
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wondered if we could explore it. Let's just accept that 
"yes, there is a demand, that some misleading information 
does get issued," and explore the implications.
 (JR): In talking about the misleading information, I 
think It may be important that whatever research was done on 
the forecast accuracy it could only focus on forecasts that
were issued, that were made. Clearly, if there is an
incentive not to issue negative forecasts, we probably then 
find that the forecasts that were issued may have not had a 
lot of reason not to be fairly accurate. We miss from our 
empirical sample of data all the forecasts not issued. If 
you assume that the incentive is not there to issue a negative 
forecast, then we are looking at basically a very biased 
sample.
Discussion Leader (RK): That is irrelevant, because 
we are not deciding whether the company should issue forecasts 
or not. That is an accounting question. If they do do it, 
should there be an auditor’s role in that? Is that an increase 
in responsibility?
Let me just indicate one other cost. I just talked about 
the cost of the auditor involvement. Another cost is the delay 
cost. If the process has to be audited in advance before the 
announcement, assuming auditor involvement, it could increase
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the amount of time until that announcement comes out and 
increase the amount of leakage of information which could 
get into the market.
(GS): That brings up a point that I think is appropos 
exactly to auditing—to auditor’s problems. Given the 
efficient market, or whatever you want to assume there, is 
it not probably true that if you realize that news is going 
to get out that the important thing, whenever in auditing 
there is, if there is ever, a tradeoff between timeliness 
and credibility, you ought to opt for credibility rather 
than timeliness? I think that is true because accounting 
statements by and large are not going to be fresh news. 
Therefore, their role is to establish a credibility or a 
verification of news that is already there and a framework 
for interpreting new news. Thus, whenever there has to be 
a tradeoff between timeliness and credibility, wouldn't an 
implication of the evidence be that we should opt for
credibility rather than timeliness? Is that a fair
statement?
(RE): The two may not be completely interchangeable. 
The important thing here is to distinguish between the cor­
rective effect of the auditor and the deterrent effect. The 
fact that the information may have to be audited a few months
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from now may motivate management to get 90 percent of 
the imprecision out of the information now already, 
so that it may not he necessary to audit it immediately.
(GS): But what I am saying is that when there is a 
tradeoff, it seems to me a reasonable statement to say that 
when a conflict appears between timeliness and credibility,
it should be resolved based on the evidence of how the 
accounting information was used for credibility and precision
rather than in favor of timeliness.
(GW)Do you mean from the standpoint of the capital 
market? That is clearly not the results you want when
you are talking about other users, such as salesmen, who 
care less about accuracy and much more about timeliness.
(GS): I thought that we were talking in general.
Discussion Leader (RK): I think that what perhaps the 
auditor should be doing is what they do with internal control, 
which is to establish a system by which these public
announcements get made. This would enable the auditor to 
feel better that there is at least a system that generates
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the information that gets issued. He could rely on the
system, without necessarily having to look at each particular 
announcement as it comes out. He ought to be satisfied that 
some reasonable system is available for generating information 
to the top management of the corporation when they go out and 
make all these announcements. In which case there would not 
be a conflict because they would be establishing a system, 
rather than worrying about each particular announcement.
(WN): Wouldn't having an audit provide you with that 
control? It is a kind of a benchmark, and a company can’t 
afford to be way off the mark when the final figures come 
out. I think it has the same deterrent effect on all the 
other kinds of information that are issued throughout the 
year because the annual audit is the benchmark to which 
they are going to be held accountable in the long run.
(RE): Is there no need for auditor involvement in interim
financial statements? The question is do managements within 
the period get optimistic during the first half and then have
to take it in the chin in the second half So, is the 
deterrent effect frequent enough, only coming once a year?
(WN): I think we are trying to improve our system
of accounting for interim periods, but I don't know that 
you necessarily get that in an audit.
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(MS): Bill, there is something that you said earlier 
about the analyst reviewing, whether they be forecasts or 
reports, and building up a kind of subjective judgment of
credibility over time. Here we are talking about the
auditor involvement to do something about credibility. Now, 
if the market is efficient and if over time you develop some 
measure of credibility for each firm, then why should there 
be an auditor involvement? Are we adding something at a 
cost? Will the benefit to the analyst be enhanced if he 
already has "efficient” appraisal of this in the marketplace, 
as you observed?
(JR): I think there is some evidence that quarterly 
earnings are manipulated—if you wish, managed, smoothed, as 
Bob Elliott indicated—during the first half of the year and 
that the end-of-year adjustments are used in order to look at 
the relationship and adjust the relationship between the 
annual and the previously reported quarterly earnings. I 
think this is one of the things that motivated the SEC release 
on interim reporting. I also think that there is some consistent 
evidence that this practice is being conducted. The question is 
whether it is being conducted enough to have any impact that 
would make involvement of auditors in interim reports beneficial. 
That is still an unresolved question.
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(MS): Well, is the impact such that the market doesn't 
see through it as they see through changes in accounting 
methods?
(JR): Well, I don't think we really have conclusive 
evidence of whether it does on interims or not.
Discussion Leader (RK): All allocations over time 
involve judgment, and basically, when you are looking at 
interims, there is very little information. So, you don’t 
know what to heck went on.
(WN): But you have to be careful when you are talking 
about the market. The market is a vast place. It includes 
Exxon, on the one hand, and some little bitty company, on 
the other hand. For instance, on interim earnings, I think 
that the major companies, the top 200 or 300, or even the 
Fortune 500, at least the top 200 to 300, are putting 
out pretty good information and are not consciously trying 
to make it look good in the first half, and then have to come 
to account in the second half. But as you get farther down 
the line where there are less controls, less sophisticated 
methods and so forth, that is where the problems have arisen. 
Those companies are not going to be subject to the same degree 
of SEC control. You have to make a distinction.
(JR): It may possibly be an FASB problem because
Opinion 28 relating to interims provides much more flexibility 
in preparing interim reports than the annual GAAP. That 
really provides them the ability to do this when they wish to 
do it.
(page inadvertently left blank)
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(DRC): I don’t think that Opinion 28 created any
new possibilities. Ernie, do you still have a comment?
(WN): I think that there are so many constraints on
trying to manipulate things, though. It isn’t just the 
auditor; it is all the lawsuits and a whole host of things 
that are forcing people to try to do the best possible 
reporting.
(LL): I would guess that even in your respectable big
companies that you have got a little bit of borrowing. In 
other words, they are not going to put something out that is 
going to prove false. But, if they expect a good third 
quarter and the first quarter is a cent less than they • 
expected—because they wanted a little bit more than a year 
ago—I would guess that the tendency to borrow in that situation 
is built in, and I don't know how we would ever find it. If 
we tried to, say, survey for it or investigate for it, I don't 
know how we would ever get anybody to admit that they took 
what they expected to earn that year and threw a little bit 
in the first quarter just so it wouldn't show a down trend 
because they felt the whole year was going to show an up trend.
(WN): Also, if it looked pretty good in the first period, 
they would sock a little away in their pockets and bring it out
later.
(LL): Yes, they might save a little for the next quarter;
I think this exists, even in the most respectable companies.
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(WN): Of course, that happens on an annual basis 
as well.
(LL): Yes, I agree with that.
(DRC): We should take a break. Mr. Hicks had raised 
his hand earlier.
(EH): Well, please don’t break on my account. I 
am not sure if it is useful, but I am going to comment anyhow.
I keep hearing things that I regard as misconceptions, and 
I keep wanting to react to them. Mention was made a while 
ago about having the auditor establish a system whereby a 
company would produce information for press releases; at 
least that is what came through to me. I had two reactions 
to that. One is that if a company needs a system to generate 
information for press releases—and it probably does—it 
ought to have one. And, if it wanted to turn to its public 
accountants for advice as to how to set one up, it probably 
would, but that in itself, it seems to me, is not the kind 
of thing we are talking about here. At least, it should not 
be the kind of thing that we are talking about here. We seem 
to be suggesting that the auditor should have a responsibility 
to see that the company has that kind of system. My other 
point is that if you talk about relying on a system to generate 
information for press releases, or even a system for quarterly 
information or whatever else, the system is really almost a 
pointless concept. The concept of a system is almost pointless
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because problems arise when people, usually at a high
rather than at a low level, decide—as they can and sometimes 
do—to thwart the system.
(KJ): Doug, are you going to come back to this 
after the break?
(DRC): I didn't plan to.
(KJ): In the interest only of getting something that 
I wanted to say down before we move on, I come around this 
way. Items A and B of the outline really deal with two 
different aspects of the audit as a discipline, although it 
doesn't come through clearly. In respect to Item B, which 
deals with analysis of the effects of discretionary costs and 
depreciation methods, I ask myself: Where does the efficient 
market presently get the information to make the evaluations 
so that it is not fooled when companies switch from one 
method to another? So, it is difficult for me to see that the 
auditor in making a contribution would do much that isn't 
already feeing done by some other group. We would be adding a 
cost, and I fail to see that the auditor’s analysis of the 
effectiveness of a depreciation method or of the effectiveness 
of the personnel development program within a company really 
adds anything that would be useful, if the market is truly 
efficient. Now, just let me loop back to Item A. I have to 
take a different view than George did about the tradeoff between
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timeliness and credibility—credibility was the word he 
used, but I think he was trying to say accuracy—it would 
seem to me that if there is a place where the auditor can 
be involved, it is in a sense of participation that is limited 
to something that adds usefulness to the data. Now, let me 
see if I can go back to that. It would seem to me that if a 
company were making a press release, there is a danger of a 
big lie as opposed to a delicate shading. I would expect 
that a delicate shading type of error—if you can get off 
that end of the scale—can ordinarily be interpreted by the 
market because of its efficiency, but the real danger is the 
big lie on the other end of the scale, where the information 
put out is just "untruthful." It would seem to me that if 
you adopt that policy, you would say, well, that the auditor 
will tailor what he does, not to pick up Items all the way 
across the scale, but just to pick up maybe the top quadrant 
and that he is really interested in satisfying himself that a 
company isn’t using a big-lie technique. In that sense, an 
appropriate limitation as to the auditor's objective, if he were 
to be involved, would be to add something that could be of 
value, as I understand this efficient market concept.
Discussion Leader (RK): Let me just say as to Ken’s 
first point about Item B, about the efficient market. The 
market is efficient in what I call the semi-strong form with
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respect to publicly available information. So, that when a 
company switches depreciation methods, that usually is noted 
by the auditors and the effect of the change is noted. That 
information can be processed by the market. As for infor­
mation on inaccurate estimates of lives of depreciable assets 
or residual values on discretionary expenditures, that 
information is not disclosed. It is basically not in the 
market, so we should not assume that that information is 
impounded in current stock prices. So, what I was getting at 
was, perhaps, that that information is relevant and maybe we 
want it to be impounded in stock prices. What is the vehicle 
for doing that? Again, the auditors do have unique access to 
that kind of information and perhaps could disclose it. The fact 
that the market is efficient does not mean that it knows
everything.
(KJ): Well, do you mean to say that the system of 
pushing out information in Form 10Q reports showing property 
additions and estimates of lives by types of assets, property 
withdrawals and the amount of depreciation by types of assets, 
and a ’’funds” statement doesn’t really provide the Information 
for people to make their analyses presently?
Discussion Leader (RK): Is there enough information 
in that so that we know all the fully depreciated assets that 
a company has and is using?
-6l-
(KJ): I don’t think that information is there, but 
there is some data that sometimes allows you to calculate it, 
for example, using a scheme something like the reserve ratio 
test that used to be in the IRS Code. There is an awful lot 
of information available, and I would be surprised if people 
were surprised about the improper estimation of the useful 
lives of corporations’ assets.
Discussion Leader (RK): I don’t have any hard evidence 
that says that they know it or that they don’t know it. I was 
just speculating on it. Maybe they do.
(EH): If I could say just one more thing, it would be
that this whole last discussion about disclosing the residual 
value or discretionary expenditures, as an example, seems 
almost irrelevant to what we are talking about here today, 
if what we are talking about are the. auditor’s responsibilities. 
The question there is, should generally accepted accounting 
principles, whose determination is a function of the FASB, 
should they require that that kind of information be disclosed? 
And I hope that around the table there is an understanding of 
the difference between requiring new information to be presented 
and imposing an obligation on auditors with respect to that
new information.
(DRC): I think there is that understanding now. We
should take a 10 minute break.
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SOME POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS 
TO THE EFFICIENCY OF CAPITAL MARKETS
Chairman of Morning Session, Douglas R. Carmichael
The outline has been passed out. George has identified
a number of interesting questions. We have discussed the 
efficient market hypothesis; I think our background on that is 
probably sufficient. We can now dig into the questions that 
George has offered for us.
Outline Prepared by George Benston
I. If the market for traded stocks is efficient, i.e.,
information is impounded into share prices very quickly, the 
data included in financial statements are not useful to 
investors unless:
1. some information otherwise doesn’t get to the market;
2. some information is disclosed to the market only because 
it later would have to be published in financial reports;
3. publication of financial data acts as an incentive to 
managers to serve the best interests of shareholders.
What do we know or can we learn of these possibilities?
II. With respect to the stewardship function of auditing (assuming 
efficient capital markets) to what extent should the auditor be 
responsible for reporting on management’s performance? Consider 
the following, particularly with respect to materiality and 
reporting to (a) the board of directors, (b) shareholders,
(c) the SEC and other regulatory authorities, and (d) police 
authorities:
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1. failure to meet contractually determined (implicitly or 
explicitly) fiduciary responsibilities
a. outright stealing
b. self-dealing
c. less than arm’s length contracts
d. questionable behavior, including personal behavior 
likely to damage the image or position of the 
corporation
2. failure to use the resources of the firm effectively
a. ineffective internal controls
b. ineffective management controls (e.g., information 
system, production planning, market forecasts, 
control over expenditures)
c. bad decision making resulting in possibly avoidable 
losses (query: when should this be recognized?)
d. errors of Judgment
III. What is the rationale that supports or rejects require­
ments imposed on private corporations that govern the extent of 
audits?
1. Would the optimal amount of auditing be achieved without 
requirements being imposed by a governmental or private 
authority?
2. If not, what are the relevant externalities and utility 
mal-distributions?
IV. Where there is no market for ownership claims in an 
enterprise, should auditing be required and specified? The 
following situations might be considered:
1. partnerships
2. corporations with relatively few owners
3. governmental bodies (states, municipalities, authorities, 
school districts)
Discussion Leader, George J. Benston
I want to make an extremely brief introductory remark.
Then, I really want to talk either to this outline or to what­
ever you choose, so it need not be restricted to the outline.
I Just put down everything that I thought of, and when I
-64-
reached the bottom of the paper, I stopped. I didn’t
feel like xeroxing any more than one page.
Basically, I can say that I think this is a very
important conference and a very important idea. But, first, 
let me give just some very small background information for 
myself, at least. When I started out in the accounting business 
as a CPA, I admit that I neither knew of the efficient market or, 
for that matter, of markets or marginal cost or any of these 
minor things that I learned when I went to Chicago. All I 
did as a CPA was to do audits and present stuff and worry 
about what the AICPA said I was supposed to do and, you know, 
the little bit of nuisance the SEC was doing. Those were the 
grand old days when it was relatively easy, before we learned 
how good Andy Barr really was. And so then, having done that, 
when I got to Chicago, we worried about the fact that information 
should be useful to investors, because everything was in terms 
of prediction and these data should be very useful to investors. 
In fact, accounting ought to be concerned with the question of 
investment decisions in the market because that was what 
economists were concerned with. We all were concerned—my 
doctorate is in economics, not accounting—and we all were 
concerned with economics. So, the whole question came up 
about how accounting data will inform the market in terms of 
making decisions. And—the auditing function—not only were 
we unconcerned with auditing; we didn't teach it and thought
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it beneath us to do research in it because that was the
grubby work of those CPAs who were out there with which 
academics should not soil their hands. Hard work is 
distasteful anyway, so we try to avoid that.
In any event, the first piece of research 
I did on this question in 1967 on the relation of accounting 
data to stock prices was not done with the efficient 
market in mind. in fact, the efficient market literature 
really didn’t enter at that point, and I have to be honest and 
say that I really wasn’t thinking about it. What I was 
really thinking about was: What accounting data are people 
using to make their decision? I guess it wasn’t that clear 
in my mind at that time that they may not be using the stuff 
at all and, in fact, that there was every reason to believe 
that they wouldn’t be using the stuff. I thought about the 
arguments that we used to have in the accounting workshops. 
George Sorter was there and Dave Green and Sidney Davidson 
arguing: What is it that investors really want? I think they 
want this because I am an investor and I represent the rest of 
them and this is what I think they want. And, if we argue 
this way, it seems to me and many other people, that what we 
ought to do is to see what investors want by looking at what 
they did: namely, when accounting data were published, what 
is the relationship between various constructs of that data 
and something that happened, namely a change in the market 
price of stock? That is what the research was about as I saw it
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So, I went to some effort to do this, not completely correctly 
at that time. What I found, much to my surprise, frankly, was 
that there wasn’t any particular relationship. There was a 
small one, but not a very large one, and I expected, really 
expected, a large one. Other people followed after me. We 
found that the stock prices didn’t really adjust when the 
accounting information became available. When you think about 
the efficient market—that is, if you think about the profit 
that somebody makes by giving information quickly and acting 
upon it—you then realize that, by the time the accounting 
data are published, it is pretty late in that particular game, 
at least with respect to widely-traded securities. At that 
point, it isn't surprising that there is no particular market 
reaction when accounting data are published. In fact, when I 
think back on it, I think, "Why the hell didn’t I see that in
advance?" It seems obvious now; it didn’t seem obvious then, though.
What this did was throw at least my thinking back to
what accounting is about, and, frankly, I have come full circle 
back to the days when I never thought about it much: namely, 
that what an accountant really is is an auditor. We are really 
not trying to move the markets for shares; they move, in my 
opinion, very well by themselves. The information we produce 
is not terribly useful in that sense. But what the auditor does 
in digging into what is going on in the firm, determining whether
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the management is honest or dishonest, determining what has 
'"really happened—and the management knows that what has happened 
is going to he produced by independent professionals, someone 
reporting on the stewardship of that company—is extremely 
important and very difficult. I think that accounting,
in fact, is not only a viable profession I think 
it is also socially a very important profession. Indeed, 
what auditors might be seriously considering are their audit 
responsibilities in places where there is no market, namely 
cities—not to cast aspersions about any particular city, of 
course—but cities in general, school districts, states, 
government agencies, and a variety of other things, where 
there is no market, where there is no ownership claim other 
than the claim of all the citizens over this. And the 
auditor again, being that independent professional who comes 
in and says this is what happened, is extremely important. So,
I would sort of like to direct some of the discussion, not 
direct It, but suggest our movement in that direction toward 
some of these questions.
Now what I have listed in the outline are not things 
that I necessarily believe. I tried to take it from one 
extreme to the other to see where we might go and to get a 
continuum. For example, I am not suggesting that the auditor 
be a policeman, but it has been so suggested. Indeed,
I think there are people in the SEC who believe that this
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should be the case, that society functions best where every 
person makes sure that his or her neighbor is not violating 
any law that happens to be on the books. We can have such a 
society, and people do. But the question is: What are the 
costs? Now, obviously the framework in which I suggest we 
discuss all of this is the framework that Bob Elliott has 
put forth—namely, a cost-benefit framework. As a colleague 
once put it to me, you can have a frictionless world if you 
are willing to coat it with about two feet of grease. The 
questions are: Is it worth it? Is the trade-off between not 
having friction and having to wallow around in grease really 
something we want? We can have a world without crime if we 
are willing to give police enormous authority, assuming that 
they aren’t perpetrating the crime, which is not always a 
valid assumption. But, in any event, there are costs and 
benefits to all this to the point where we have to accept a 
certain amount of things that we prefer not to have because the 
cost to do something about it is excessive, that is to say, is 
not a tradeoff that we are willing to have. One has to keep 
 all that in mind, although I didn’t mention that explicitly.
But I didn’t want to talk a lot and I hope I haven’t.
What I suggest is that we go through the outline or, as I say, 
anything else that one wants and carry on the discussion from 
earlier and try to focus in on what the auditor’s responsibilities are 
and. what the function of auditing is, given what I think the state
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of the world is for publicly-traded companies—namely, that 
the market gets information very quickly when that information 
is published and even if it isn't published.
There is one other thing that I would like to say 
aside from the costs and benefits. And that is, if we 
believe something may be true, we also ought to consider the 
questions: How can we find out? What information, data, 
would be consistent or inconsistent with that belief? It is
simply not enough—it is important to raise the question—
that we think something or other is the case. We have to go 
to the next step and ask, If this were the case what can we 
look at that would tell us that we are right or we are wrong?
That is to say that we are willing to change our minds when 
we get additional information. Also, there are questions in 
which there is no way of studying the matter, and we just 
have to say: "It is my belief and that is the end of it.
Maybe I can be persuasive."
Would anyone like to open up? I have sort of said what 
I would like to say here, and I would like to open it to all of you
GENERAL DISCUSSION
(MRC): Since the focus here is on auditing, why don’t
we address your Item II and your offer to expand on it? I 
think that we should start with Item II(2) from the outline.
Discussion Leader (GB): Yes, okay, I will expand it.
Again, I don't want to talk; I really don’t like to open as we
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have, as I saw this morning, a very intelligent, voluble
group, and I don't think that you want to hear me lecturing.
(MFC): I find Item II(2) particularly appropriate
and timely. Lee Layton and I had quite a discussion on
this subject yesterday.
Discussion Leader (OB): Well, let me mention a few 
of the things here. Take the question of internal controls, 
the first one under Item II (2); I tried to put this out asa 
continuum. To what extent is reporting on stewardship, which, 
is after all, historically where we all started out, a function 
of auditing? A steward was given charge of the estate, and 
someone could come and say,"what did he do with those resources?" 
The question is one, I think, we ought to consider: To what extent 
does the auditor have a comparative advantage in reporting 
on how effective management works? The second aspect is 
again the cost-benefit analysis. What is the cost of doing 
this relative to the value of the information one gets?
(MFC): Are you suggesting a reporting requirement
beyond the financial statements?
Discussion Leader (GB): I’m suggesting this is 
something auditors ought to be concerned with. I can give 
you my opinion on this, if you like.
(MFC): I am sorry; I am trying to determine if in
what you are saying, you are talking about a responsibility 
that would go beyond the formal financial statements, or whether
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you were saying that the formal financial statements should 
in some way reflect a Judgment as to stewardship.
Discussion Leader (GB): Well, I’m suggesting that 
the financial statements are primarily useful as they 
reflect the Judgment with respect to stewardship. But I 
don't mean to imply by that that every aspect of stewardship 
is worth doing; the cost of it may be excessive. I would 
certainly like to know as an individual stockholder, whether 
the managements of companies have done everything they could 
possibly do to maximize my wealth as represented by claims of the 
corporation. What I don't believe is that the auditor is - 
capable of determining or that the cost of the auditor doing 
this is worth it, relative to the cost of my getting the 
information from other sources. So, that if we go back 
taking it from Item d, ’’errors of Judgment," backwards, I 
can’t see where the auditor has a comparative advantage in 
deciding whether the manager has used his or her Judgment 
effectively in running the corporation. I think to attempt 
to put that into the audit function would be a very serious 
error. I don't think anybody would like that; well, no, clearly, 
somebody would like it.
(MFC): A particular consequence may be due to an 
error in Judgment in relation to some other things.
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Discussion Leader (GB): Yes. Then it is just a 
matter of sorting that out.
(MFC): Should the financial statements reflect the 
decisions?
Discussion Leader (GB): Yes. Well, I tell you, my 
personal opinion is that it should stop at fraud. It should 
stop at the manager violating the contractual agreement in 
the sense of appropriating the resources of the firm for 
his own use as against the use by the stockholders. The 
auditor should not he responsible for determining whether 
the manager has operated the firm efficiently or effectively, 
because I don’t believe the auditor has a comparative advantage 
in that decision. I think a decision has to be made, but the audi­
tor is not the person who is capable of making that'. In fact, he 
might very well violate_what is more important by attempting to get 
into being the second manager, which is really what we are 
talking about.
(BE): Then, you believe that the GAO standards, which
do go beyond fiscal accountability to program efficiency and 
effectiveness as well as compliance auditing, are rather a 
full scope. You believe that the GAO is perhaps in error
on that.
Discussion Leader (GB): No, not as the arm of the Government 
and not for government agencies. They lack the profit motive.
-73-
(RE): Well, there is no clear reason to me why those
standards wouldn't be equally applicable in a profit-oriented 
environment.
(RK): It may be, but we have another standard.
We do have profits and survival in the capital market. So, 
there is a cutting edge. Long sequences of bad decisions 
eventually show up, where, as we all know, there is no such 
mechanism in the government. And so we have instituted one, 
perhaps, the GAO one.
(LL): Excuse me, when you said government, you meant 
government as the body being audited, or government as the 
body doing the auditing?
Discussion Leader (GB): The body being audited.
(DS): Well, do you think that internal auditors can 
exercise the judgment that would be called for in Item II(2)?
Discussion Leader (GB): Yes, I think they Could exercise 
some of it. I think that internal auditors have the ability 
to, certainly to see that the internal controls are being followed 
on all levels below the top levels; I don't think that they have any 
chance of doing it on the top and that is where the external
auditor comes in.
(MS): We didn’t get the question here, David. Would 
you repeat the question on the relationship of internal-external 
auditing?
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(DS): Yes, I’m asking what, in fact, if the internal 
auditors could exercise judgment on some of these things, what 
prevented the outside auditor from doing the same thing, if, in 
fact, it is desirable?
Discussion Leader (GB): Well, it is partly a matter 
of cost; it is a matter of what is the most efficient way of 
doing this? I think it has been really well determined that it 
is much more efficient to have this internal-external split.
(MS): Well, I think an extension on David's point 
would be, perhaps, not for the external auditor to do it 
necessarily, but to determine whether the methodology and 
the approach used by the internal auditor is adequate for 
the situation. Rather than having the external auditor do it 
and register an opinion on whether the judgment of the 
management was right or wrong, have the external auditor 
evaluate, ex post, the internal auditor's technique of judging 
managerial decision to determine whether it is adequate, so that 
we can therefore assume that the control is there. Now, is 
that a role of the external auditor?
(DS): I am not questioning whether external auditors
should do these things. Let’s leave that question out. You were 
saying that even if it were desirable, it wouldn’t be practical. 
My question is whether, in fact, it can be done by the internal
auditor?
Discussion Leader (GB): Well, as I said, it is first 
a matter of the relative cost of this. The question that is 
a part of the SAPs is whether the external auditors should
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report upon the existence or non-existence of internal control. 
Certainly, it is well established that if the internal controls 
are such that the records of the firm cannot support the 
financial statements—and you don’t know what is in the inventory 
and you can’t find out (you can’t count it all) or that you 
don’t know where the money went—then the auditor may not be 
able to render an opinion on the financial statements. But 
then you go to the next question: What if the auditor—let's 
say the MAS service group—reviewed the controls and said 
these controls are not sufficient to run the company effectively? 
Let’s suppose that they found that you are not making good 
sales forecasts, you do not have a good inventory control system 
in the sense that you may be overstocking or mis-stocking,
and so on. The question then is, does the external auditor 
have a responsibility to put this in the statement? It is not 
now established that he does. This company doesn’t have 
controls that would enable it to run effectively. However,
this doesn't mean that the financial statements are wrong; it 
means that the company—from the auditor’s knowledge of the 
company—is not being efficiently managed. Is that what reports 
on stewardship should include?
(LL): Manny and I were discussing this yesterday on a 
preliminary basis. But we had gotten beyond the financial
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statements, and we were considering reporting. We were
considering the question of reporting to whom? And we got 
to reporting to the independent directors of a company, not 
management itself. We had gotten a little further down the line 
than you did, not within the framework of financial statements, 
but reporting what we had found within the framework of a 
management letter, without the responsibility to find 
everything. We were really ranging quite far in this area.
Discussion Leader (GB): Then I would raise the 
question to you. Let’s assume that you found all of this 
and you gave it to the directors, what is your responsibility 
as an auditor to the stockholders? What if the board of 
directors are not acting upon you advice?
(MFC): This is precisely the question we were debating 
yesterday. We came to no conclusions, however.
(GS): Manny, let me try to rephrase Item II(2) here, 
because it bothers me. I don’t think that, with all due 
deference to the almost superhuman skills of auditors, we are 
the most expert lawyers or management experts, who can decide 
and evaluate what is the most efficient, or what is efficient 
or legal and what is not legal, and I feel uncomfortable in 
being thrust in the role of sort of a judge. So, therefore, 
with respect to failure to use the resources of the firm 
effectively, do we have any comparative advantage to decide
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what it is—how resources are used effectively—or that
there is only one possible effective way of using  
resources or are there many based on different cost-benefit 
relationships ? Let me try to rephrase—possibly without 
making this judgmental statement—is it or can it be the 
responsibility of auditors (and here we get into Mr. Hicks’ 
problem again, obviously) to make a descriptive statement 
to someone (let’s leave that aside for the moment) about the 
internal controls that are existing, about the management 
policies—just like you now have for accounting policies, 
a description of accounting policies—a description of the 
management policies that are existing, and that in fact they 
are existing? In other words, a statement of whether they are 
said to exist and whether they are existing, without necessarily 
evaluating them. I’m not sure that it should be the auditor’s 
function to say that these are the most efficient set of 
management policies, because there may be many, or even to say 
that this is the most efficient set of internal controls. You 
have a tradeoff in internal controls, too, between benefits and 
costs. But, can it be or is it possible for the auditor to be 
required to report to someone about what the internal controls 
are, what management policies are, what they are said to be and 
what they are? In other words, is that legitimate—and that 
is rephrasing it away from that sort of judging it—for 
the auditor to just report what they are said to be and what
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they actually are?
(MFC): Isn’t that to a substantial extent now going
on in terms of the management letter.
(GS): Well, I think it is, to some degree.
(CW): No, not the way George described it.
(GS): Well, let me put it in terms of internal controls. 
Suppose we presently think a company has weaknesses in its in­
ternal control, we will do more auditing in order to satisfy 
ourselves with the propriety of the statements. We may make 
certain suggestions to strengthen internal control. But 
the question is, do we report the following: "The firm 
assumes that the following internal control procedure is in 
existence; this is what actually exists," without necessarily 
opining on whether this is the optimal system of management 
control? The same question arises with respect to management 
policies toward certain critical management actions. I don’t 
know whether it is right for a given firm, or most efficient, 
to engage in making market forecasts or use one production 
planning system or another; it depends on the sort of 
variations they are willing to buy, and so on.
(MFC): What if you have a system of internal control 
which requires that the auditor every year to extend the 
scope of his audit?
(GS): That is exactly it. I would say he has to go
beyond that.
-79-
(CW): Is there something wrong with that, because
that might, from a cost standpoint, be the best way to do 
it? It might be better for us to extend our procedures 
slightly than for management to hire a full-time receiving 
clerk who would than have a function independent from the 
rest of the purchasing function.
(GS): Well, that is not exactly our Judgment. But 
we should report to someone that the following internal control 
system exists and how that relates to what purportedly exists.
(RE): Well, the fact is, George, that we do that now and 
we do it for third party consumption also. Now, we don’t do it 
on every company, but there is a model to be followed there.
For example, on EDP service bureaus, it is very common, where 
many other people are relying on the quality of controls there, 
to go in, review the controls, and issue a report that says: 
"Here is what management says the controls are, and this is 
what we found to be the case.”
(GS) : And can that be extended to significant 
management policies? So, there would be a statement of 
management policies and a statement of whether these are in 
fact being followed without opining on whether these are the 
correct policies.
(MS): I have some difficulty there.
(HJ) : Why shouldn’t management, instead of the auditor,
do that?
(GS): Well, certainly, it is management’s report. The 
point is that management says that these are the policies and
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it would be the audit function to determine whether these are 
the policies actually being carried out.
(hj): You are in part suggesting an extension of 
disclosure, which, again, is beyond the purview of auditing.
(GS): I Just said that I’m getting back to Mr. Hick's
problem.
(MS): I’m still having some difficulty with the way
we are using internal control—its definition. And also, I 
think it would be fair at this point—it is mentioned in the 
booklet—to consider to whom we report on normal reporting to 
stockholders and the increasing role of reporting to audit 
committees. Since this is on the scene, I think we might 
address both. But coming back to the notion of internal 
control, I think,- based on what George submitted, we can think 
of internal controls vis a vis the financial report, the 
published report, as one group, which is the way we are doing 
it now. The extension that George suggests has to do with 
internal controls as they relate to the internal management of 
the business. Now, the internal management of the business 
deals with resource allocation. My concern is not to second 
guess the management, but to raise the question, is the role 
of the auditor one of concern with the quality of the control 
evaluative system internally, which then gives rise to 
transactions and activity, which is then audited ex post by
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the auditor as he relies on the internal control system which 
is tied to the financial report? I think the question to 
he addressed under Item II(2) is, Is it a role of the auditor 
to examine this activity within a company? Or is it something 
that the auditor should walk away from and say this is 
irrelevant to my task because I’m concerned solely with the 
external reporting? And therefore ex post the matter of 
allocation of resources is something the auditor doesn’t
look at. The end result is that what he looked at he can 
say that that indeed happened.
(MFC): I want to put this into perspective. One of the
arguments is, that financial statements fairly presented 
reflect the resource allocation and use, and that therefore 
nothing further is required. You were raising the question 
of whether something more is required.
(MS): Yes, I was, particularly if you think in terms of 
the audit committee and the emerging responsibility of the 
external auditor, vis a vis the obligation of the audit committee, 
whose charter goes beyond the mere review of the internal control 
system vis a vis the annual report.
(KJ): In order to think about this in a logical way, 
you have got to leave aside the question of to whom should the 
auditor report? There is some sort of bias in there. It is 
a political problem that suggests that the auditor can’t report
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on internal control because a long letter of weaknesses will 
affect adversely on management of the company. It is often 
stated this way: that people who are not familiar in depth 
with the company can’t understand the auditor's recommendations 
But I believe that the right interpretation is the first one. 
Leave aside who reports and then come back...
(MFC): I want to be sure that I understand you, Ken.
Are you saying there is a bias there that isn’t dealt with?
(KJ): I think there is a bias that gets introduced 
when we start talking—and it belongs in there logically— 
but I think the right way to explore the question is to leave 
aside initially who gets the report and start by dealing with 
the areas in which the auditor can make a contribution. We 
can then determine where we have skills, and then decide 
whether that contribution, whatever it is, is going to be 
useful. Only then should we attempt to decide who should get 
the information.
(MFC): I assume that is the range in Item II(2), from
(a) to (d).
(KJ): Well, I am not sure. Let me go back for a 
minute and deal with the question of relevance, because I'm 
just astounded by Mr. Werner’s comment that it may be cheaper 
for us to extend our auditing procedures a little bit than it 
would be for a company to...
(MFC): That’s a little bit of his bias.
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(KJ): Let me go back and put it in here, in what I 
think is the right sort of neutral perspective. Those that 
know me understand that neutrality is my hallmark. It 
does seem to me that the auditor, in terms of his relevance, 
that is, in conducting an efficient examination, has got to 
be concerned about (we have heard this morning earlier, 
credibility of management, but that really is not an issue,) 
but has got to be concerned about whether he has an under­
standing of the business affairs of the company. And we are 
as concerned, or a good auditor is as concerned, about 
whether he understand the substance of one transaction as
he is about other aspects of the audit. And that is trans­
latable in practice to a concern about the type of errors 
that management makes internally. Every auditor can recall 
from his own experience the company where the auditor 
walks in and in just going around the shop perceives 
immediately that there Is an obvious problem in production 
control. It is important for the auditor to see it, because 
it has important auditing implications on inventory, on the 
way costs are produced, and so on. So everybody will agree 
that the auditor should learn about it. However, I don’t think 
we are prepared yet to say that the auditor, having perceived 
it, should now go and tell someone that their production 
control system is bad. I think it is kind of a shyness because I 
think that we have information and that, we are going to be criti­
cized if we have information and people ultimately discover that 
we can do it and we haven't been doing anything about it for all 
of this period of time, in my opinion.
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(RK): I think the auditors should confine their 
attention to "the financial statements presents fairly," 
however defined. In the other areas, George’s concern about 
the management capability and effectiveness, for example, really 
comes in to the use of the audit committee of the board of
directors. It is really the function of the board of directors 
to see to it that the management is operating well. I could 
see the audit committee could sponsor a study either by the 
external auditors or by perhaps the management services people 
in a firm perhaps to be in a better position to judge managerial 
decisions and the quality of the decisions.
(MFC): I didn’t mean to interrupt but the question you 
are raising is really a much more basic question. Whom does the 
audit committee represent? Whom does the board represent? Whom 
do the independent members of the board represent? If you accept 
the view that they represent the shareholders, presumably, you 
are then reporting to the shareholders, although they don’t 
tell them about it. Now the question was raised earlier, I 
think by George, what if a report is made and nothing happens? 
That is the second question.
(RK): You mean a pejorative or negative report? They 
could finish the study and everything could indicate that 
management is doing okay, and they are using pretty good models, 
maybe not the best ones, but basically good ones.
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(MFC): No, I mean not pejorative but maybe critical 
in some of these areas that are reported to the audit 
committee. Let us suppose that the audit committee finds 
itself incapable of dealing with it, not that it refuses 
to deal with it, and next time around, the auditor sees 
that the situation is continuing. He presumably—this is the 
assumption here—felt that the matters were material enough 
to require him to make a report. That is the way he comes out.
(RK): I don't know who is going to be so smart or who
would want to be so smart in that situation. I think that 
the audit committee and the outside directors, who are 
presumably very experienced business people dealing with it, 
can make the judgment as to the appropriate response. I think 
that they ultimately bear very heavy burdens and that it is 
properly where the burdens should be. The auditor is being 
a little presumptious, I think, to say that I know it is wrong, 
and I’m going to tell the world, even though the audit committee
won’t listen.
(JR): The question here is: Do they have incentive to
make always correct judgments?
(MFC): Well, they have disincentives to make bad ones, 
and sometimes they are very substantial. Litigation in the 
past two decades has demonstrated that. The point is, 
theoretically, that they do represent shareholders, as do
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the interested directors, the officer directors. Maybe the 
burden is greater on the officer directors because they do 
have a conflict, so to speak, between the representation of 
their own performance as against what the shareholders under­
stand. But let us put that to one side. This is why I said 
earlier that this is kind of a basic question; I don’t know 
whether our Commission is going to wander into basic questions 
of corporate law, etc. But, there is a question raised by the 
point that you made; it has been raised by some prominent people 
and it has been debated. Is the audit committee capable, 
without a staff, without proper assistance, other than the in­
dependent auditors, who may find themselves very uncomfortable, 
if the audit committee pursues it far enough so you have to 
point a finger at somebody? Can they do it without the 
assistance of the independent auditors? And should or will the 
internal auditors assume that responsibility?
(MS): Manny, if I could address that issue, I would 
like just to try to give an answer, based on a meeting on audit 
committees that we had here only about two weeks ago. At that 
meeting, we had representatives of audit committees, CPA firms, 
some financial executives and always some academics hanging on 
to learn. The view there was that a staff was not important. 
Interestingly enough, this very question came up, and we had 
some rather experienced audit committee members from large 
corporations. They felt that the need for a staff to administer
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their role was not that important. Instead, they felt that 
they could rely upon the external CPA and the internal audit 
staff increasingly to do that job and to highlight these variations, 
both in terms of internal control, vis a vis the published report, 
and the kinds of controls under Item II(2) in George’s outline— 
and I restate—not to second guess the management, but rather 
to see if the system used in evaluating performance internally, 
is adequate. They felt that they had the resources in 
hand and that with their experience, which Bob alluded to, 
they could discharge their responsibility.
(MFC): From personal experience, I can say that I found 
that generally to be the case. It really depends on the 
composition of the audit committee and on whether it is really 
allowed to be more than some kind of a signpost. When an audit 
committee is composed of persons with experience and some 
determination, it does a very effective job. But on this 
question of a staff—and, I didn’t mean to make any suggestions—
I had an interesting experience in trying to settle a case 
involving a multi-national corporation. The management was 
entirely new but the SEC was still thinking of bringing a 
lawsuit. I think that we dissuaded them from that. But, 
nevertheless, at some point, I had suggested that it would be 
a strengthened audit committee if it had a staff, and, by God, 
we offered to provide the audit committee with an acccountant,
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a senior investigative accountant. I thought the SEC staff 
would grab at that, but they said: "ah, nuts, that is 
just duplicated in the internal audit. We don’t think much 
of it." We weren’t very anxious to do it, and they didn’t like 
it. So, that was the end of that. Of course, that was Just a 
lawyer gambit, I must confess.
(MS): But Just let me mention another point that
came up in the session, which was very interesting. There was 
one case mentioned in which they have an annual appropriation 
of a sum for the audit committee. The committee could use 
that sum, should the need arise, rather than an ongoing 
staff, and it occasionally tapped that source when a problem 
arose that they felt neither the internal auditor nor the 
external auditor could resolve, and they needed advice.
The committee used the funds in that way.
(MFC): There is one aspect of the audit thing, which has
gotten to be very popular recently, and unfortunately, I have 
been involved in more than my fair share of these cases that 
involve illegal payments, and so on. In those cases, the 
audit committees have been very, very effective, but in each 
of those cases, the auditors were there. You really couldn’t 
do the Job without the auditors, and they do a special type 
of examination. Moreover, they do have lawyers especially 
retained to do this.
(GS): In that regard, I noticed that there seems to be
a fundamental conflict between what Ken said and what Bob said;
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I may be wrong. I must say that I side with Ken. I 
think Bob said that the auditor’s responsibility ends sort 
of with the determination of whether the statements fairly 
present. . Well, the statements are really a result. The 
question is, can the result—I mean—is that enough? Must 
there be a mechanism, must there be—not a judgment—but a 
description of the means by which these ends are attained, 
because although they may work this time, they may not the 
next time, and so on? In other words, is fairly present 
satisfied if you describe the results only without some 
description of' the procedures? Ken’s example, for 
instance, about the production line—in other words—does 
the auditor’s responsibility—again, putting aside to whom 
they report—extend to reporting on, not evaluating, the 
procedures that exist? I think that is what Ken was saying, 
and I think Bob takes the opposite point of view.
(RK): I just think that management is in the best
position to make those tradeoffs between increased internal 
controls and decreased auditing.
(GS): No, no, I’m not saying that auditors should 
decide whether you should have more control or less. But 
is it important to have a description of  the procedures that 
exist to understand the results of a firm's operations?
Do the auditors have some competence in describing those 
procedures, without saying you should have different 
procedures, necessarily?
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(EH): Could I add a couple of thoughts here? First
of all I assume that we recognize when we say," is the auditor’s 
responsibility thus and so?” I assume that we recognize that 
what it is now is generally as described by Bob Kaplan and what 
we are really talking about is whether it should be expanded 
to include something else.
Now, I have two or three thoughts on the matter 
of this description of procedures. First of all, is it 
useful to suggest a bare description of procedures without 
accompanying that description with an appraisal? The typical 
appraisal is, I guess, "adequate” or "not inadequate.” Query, 
of what use is a bare description of a set of procedures?
Beyond that, I have just one other thought, and that is that 
when we are talking about procedures, at least to the extent 
that they run to the generation of financial information, there 
is a point at which procedures leave off and judgments take over 
This point, it seems to me, is very often either ignored or 
overlooked; it is overlooked in a lot of the discussion about 
interim financial statements, for example. The reference in 
the discussion there to the auditor’s reviewing the procedures 
for determining quarterly information—and this would apply 
to annual information, it would apply to all other kinds of 
things that come out of the application of procedures— 
procedures carry you to a certain point, usually at the level 
of the repetitive recording of information, and, thereafter,
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judgments take over. Is the inventory properly valued?
Is it saleable? Are the receivables collectible? Are
the fixed asset lives reasonably determined? Those kinds of 
things involve judgment. Somehow or other we need to take 
into our calculations when we are talking about reporting on 
procedures, the very significant effect—and much more 
difficult to appraise and report on—the very significant 
effect of the judgments that take over where procedures
leave off.
(JR): Manny, you were concentrating on Item II(2) 
in George’s outline, and I wonder why. That item has as a 
premise a certain audit objective, and I would submit that to 
whom the auditor reports is clearly not independent of what we 
view audit objectives to be.
(MFC): I agree. I was just trying to arrange that very 
question in a somewhat different form. If we start with the 
assumption that George did, that the production of the financial 
statements is completely irrelevant...
(JR): On that score, I have problems.
Discussion Leader (GB): They are irrelevant in the 
sense of making investment decisions.
(MFC): Alright, now, apart from the auditor’s role 
as it may affect Items II (1, 2, or 3) in some indirect way, 
you are really suggesting a role for the auditor totally 
independent of the financial statements.
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Discussion Leader (GB): That is not quite it. Let 
me bring this back to the efficient market, because that is 
the rock upon which we are founded or upon which we have 
floundered; I am not sure which is the correct way to put it. 
But,in any event, the efficient market is what we are organized 
around. Let me try to drag that back again. I think that what 
we learned from the research and the concept with respect to 
publicly traded securities—again, it it limited to that—  
is that information about the firm of the ordinary nature 
described in the financial statements gets to the market rather 
quickly and is impounded into the stock price in an unbiased 
manner. That is to say, the market doesn't overstate or 
understate the price in a systematic way. Now, what that,
I think, tells us, as far as auditing is concerned is first, 
that we have to be concerned with the question: Is there
information that otherwise would not come to the market were
it not for the auditor? In other words, the auditors, as Bob 
put it, have a monopoly on this information, and I think that 
there are things like that such as fraud, mismanagement, gross 
mismanagement. Then, the question of a cutoff point comes 
up. There has got to be and there is a cutoff that says, 
"beyond this point, digging further and further, the auditor 
has no comparative advantage in the sense that other people 
can judge the competence of management far better than the 
auditor," because the auditor is a person with limited ability,
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as we all are, but with very strong strengths in some areas 
and not necessarily in all areas. So, where is this cutoff 
of the comparative advantages? Then, the second aspect of 
it is, aside from the comparative advantage, we ought to 
look in terms of publicly traded companies and say, to what 
extent does the market already call for this information?
Before auditing was required by any governmental agency, it 
was done, which means that it has meat . That is a very 
strong indication that it is a valued thing. People nor­
mally don’t pay for things that they don’t wish to con­
tinue to have. So, the question is, are we imposing too 
much? By "we", I mean governments, the SEC, the AICPA, as 
the—not really a monopoly, unfortunately, not as good as 
the AMA. And are we imposing costs upon people that are 
beyond the benefits that they wish to derive from it? That 
is the question that I was trying to direct the point to.
(JR): Can I address myself to the earlier remarks
that George made? I think that Item II of the outline implies 
a strictly stewardship function of the auditor. You are 
saying, at least, hypothesizing that the auditor has a compara­
tive advantage of detecting certain information which otherwise 
would not become available, like mismangement and fraud. But 
let’s take the stewardship and ask ourselves, why is the 
auditor reporting on stewardship? There are two possible 
interpretations. We will go back, if I may, a little.
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Independent auditors could not benefit from the 
objective of informing the stockholders—the public, if you 
wish—on certain things. I think this is really what 
becomes crucial and this is what we ought to look for. I 
mean those things which a. firm’s management left alone without 
audit would not have a set incentive to report upon or to 
produce the information. Now, I think, I quite agree with you 
that fraud is such a case; clearly, the management committing 
fraud would not have an incentive to report on it. Mis­
management is also such a case, although here there are 
cost-benefit issues of whether the auditor can be effective 
in detecting mismanagement. But why not just expand this 
concept of usefulness to the public or to the investor? We could 
say: "let’s explore those types of information that in the
existing market system management is not likely to have any 
incentive to generate and to disseminate." Then, why not posit 
as an audit objective to concentrate on this information? If 
the auditor cannot be effective in doing that simply because 
of his lack of qualifications, let us address that issue 
separately. But it seems to me that fraud and mismanagement is 
clearly not the only thing. This comes back to your initial 
discussion, that is your premise, which I cannot agree with
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completely, that financial statements have no usefulness as 
signals to the market for resource allocation. I don't 
think we have any conclusive evidence that it is not. We do 
have some evidence that it is; we have some evidence that 
earnings numbers affect stock prices. It has been consistently 
found that we have evidence. Once one buys this, he must 
agree that it does perform a useful purpose in signalling 
the market. I clearly agree that usefulness is much greater 
for organizations for which there is no market, like government, 
and so on. But if it does serve that useful purpose, then 
we should explore into the other kinds of information that 
managements would otherwise not make available voluntarily. 
Another side of stewardship, by the way, is deterring 
management fraud simply because management knows that it will 
be audited. But—that—it is not clear to me that it is really 
the responsibility of the independent auditor or the audit 
committee and what the cost-benefit relationships are. It 
may well be the audit committee without the independent 
auditor can do it more effectively and more cheaply.
(MSh): I would like to make explicit what a lot of 
people have been saying collectively, perhaps implicitly, 
by inference from their specific remarks. Perhaps it is useful 
to look at the overall process in the economy. We are really 
concerned with the efficient allocation of resources, and we
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really have a system design problem. How do we specialize 
various functions within the economy so as to make efficient 
utilization of resources? So, historically, we have 
various actors or participants, who have played different 
roles, and in themselves have particular interests. When 
we talk about what the auditor should or should not do, 
what the auditor's role is or is not perhaps we would do a little 
better if we stand back and say—or if we disagree with this 
point of view, then somebody else might advance another one— 
that a reasonable point of view is that we are all here 
today because we are ultimately concerned with efficient 
utilization of resources in the economy. Then we are faced with 
a question of what constitutes a good design for an economy, 
a system design for an economy? Naturally, any system is a 
specialization of functions because no one function has the 
expertise to process all of the disturbances that are going to 
happen to the system. So, we specialize roles, presumably to 
expertise. The auditor has a certain expertise; he can deal with 
certain functions. Eventually we have to relate, I think, all
of the functions to a cost-benefit framework. That is the 
only way of assessing whether in fact, the system is an effective 
way of bringing about the desired results. But I guess what 
strikes me as we are talking is that in order to answer and to 
perhaps focus on the debate, we really have to stand back and 
say: "okay, person A makes a point. How does this relate to the
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overall goal, which is to deal with efficient allocation of 
resources? Is a specialization of this function better 
handled by the auditor than by somebody else?" Then, we look 
at any one participant, say the auditor. We find out that 
he has really multiple roles. He acts as a consultant. The 
question is: Is he a better consultant than somebody else?
With respect to a lot of information, there is enough 
incentive on the part of management to internally generate It.
In other words, for their own interest, they would like to get 
certain information and be dam good at it. On the other hand, 
there are other kinds of information which they are not that 
interested in getting out. But somebody else is interested; 
maybe the auditor has to get that. Still, with respect to the 
first type, maybe the auditor has particular expertise. An 
auditor has many clients; he has a different concept of business, 
more insights, a broader background than an internal auditor 
on the staff. We may want to bring him in for that reason.
So, naturally there is going to be confusion because we are 
groping with the historical role at the same time we are trying 
to I think ultimately work towards an efficient system design 
for dealing with the allocation of resources in the economy.
We should focus on that in terms of our statements. What is the
best way to design the various functions to do that? I think 
maybe in that way we can get a little more of a convergence than
we have had so far.
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(MFC): First of all, I should say, for myself 
anyway, that my own objectives are somewhat short of the 
grand objective that you have described here, but we do have 
a problem of describing the role of the auditor in society, 
which brings us right into this. I hope that we can ultimately 
address that in some sensible way. I do want to raise one 
question here. It was suggested—although there is no 
unaminimity of opinion around the table—it was suggested that 
the auditor really doesn’t have the ability to deal with (b), (c),
and (d) of Item II(2) of the outline whether or not those are 
appropriate objectives. Yet, on the other hand, the very same 
auditor—and I use the firm rather than the individual auditor— 
advertises and sells something called MAS, which presumably 
involves (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Item II(2) in some fashion. 
Now, is there a basic inconsistency in what I just said or in 
what other people are saying in this area?
(BE): May I address that particular point? The 
question of qualifications of auditors has come up quite a 
number of times in terms of comparative advantages of 
auditors to do some of these things that are under discussion.
I think it would be wrong to conclude that because today’s 
cast of characters in the auditing profession can’t do these 
things that your Commission needs to ignore them, because the 
fact is that, if they need to be done and other people have a 
comparative advantage, we could, over a 10 or 20-year time 
frame, change the personnel characteristics and description of
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auditors. I don’t think that is a constraint over the long 
run that we ought to allow to govern these discussions to 
such a great extent.
(MFC): I wasn't suggesting that we are constrained.
(LL): Manny, you said it yourself. The auditing firms 
have these skills, but they apply them to special engagements 
rather than enhance the auditing functions.
(MFC): I’m not talking about the way the profession
accepts engagements and how it arranges for its compensations 
or anything like that. Those are separate issues irrelevant 
here today. I was really raising the question for some 
discussion here of whether there is validity to the statement 
that the auditor—that professional auditor out there—really 
doesn't have the capacity today or, as has just been suggested, 
that even if he doesn't have it as fully as he should to meet 
these objectives—assuming they are valid ones—should he 
acquire them? Those are the issues as I see them.
(RK): There is a question of to whom these different 
types of reports should go, and maybe that is what we should 
discuss. It is not clear to me that questions like (b), (c), 
and (d) of Item II(2) of the outline are appropriate things to 
be discussed with three hundred thousand stockholders.
(MFC): Why not?
(LL): In most cases, it would do damage.
(MFC): Bob, I accept that, and I merely said earlier
that I thought...
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(RK): As a stockholder, I buy securities, forty 
securities in a diversified portfolio. So, you would 
really overwhelm me with an amount of information that 
I could not tackle. I would rather delegate that responsibility 
to my outside directors and say to them: ’’Look, you are 
running this company and maybe two or three others, and' you 
better do a dam good job of it.”-
(KJ): I think your answer—what you are really saying 
is—that you don’t have the capacity, and you brought in a 
new term that we haven’t used this morning, outside directors,
which is the real benefit of the audit committee. If I
were going to do it, I would just strike audit committee, and 
say that what we are really talking about is talking to people 
who represent the stockholders and are independent from 
existing management. What you are saying is that you, 
individually, don’t have the capacity to digest and take action 
on all of the recommendations that may come out of this process. 
But in a larger sense what you are bringing out, I think, is 
that there ought to be some device in our system that allows 
for a type of specialization in terms of outside directorships 
that really would be interested in comments of that type and 
in fact may insist that we provide them with those types of 
comments.
(RK): I think that that is exactly what I was getting at
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(KJ): Well, that is a response, isn't it? It is the 
individual stockholder’s response. If the individual 
stockholder says: "Look at it this way, if you give me a 
recommendation that says, 'internal control is not good, 
there isn’t much that I can do about it.”
(RK): Suppose he holds only 27 shares.
(KJ): But he may decide: "Gosh, I need a good 
outside director on the Board of the company.” If he has 27 
votes to start with, you see, it is just uphill, but he can do it.”
(MFC): I think that that is right, and I was going to 
say, Bob, that I understood your statement of why you questioned 
the efficacy of giving this information to the shareholders 
at large, even if they are all made up of great management 
experts. One shareholder really couldn't do much about it.
But it seems to me that the assumption, the premise, underlying 
the statement was that it should be reported to the shareholders’ 
representatives. I just want to know whether that is a fair 
assumption to draw from what you said?
(RK): Well, as to the questions in (b), (c), and (d),
I think the shareholders, some shareholders’ representatives 
should have access, should be able to demand, that kind of 
information, whether they want to use the internal auditor or
the external auditors.
(MFC): When we talk about this internal auditor thing...
I am sorry.
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(DRC): Let us give Pete a chance.
(RD): I’m back to the point that Bob made a long time 
ago about the extent that financial statements present fairly 
the information. The auditor may be aware of ineffective 
management controls, and I think that means that he does a 
different kind of audit. He does more work to insure that in 
fact financial statements present fairly. I guess as. an in­
vestor, I’m relying on him, or, in effect, the investment 
community to do that. I think that what I see, ex post, the 
data I see coming out of the financial statements, do in fact 
reflect some judgment on the part of the auditor to insure 
that the statements present fairly.
(MFC): Please don’t misunderstand me. I’m deliberately 
trying to create a real conflict here. But let's take what 
you just said. What you said is that financial statements, 
assuming you don't go beyond what you consider to be the 
traditional role, reflect what has happened. Many people 
think that, for whatever purpose, whether it is market 
evaluation, or otherwise the financial statements are supposed 
to be predictive. The SEC is picking up some such silly 
notions. Now, if you merely reflect the past, and you don't 
have some information with respect to the points here, however 
that is described, then those financial statements may not
-103-
fairly predict the future. I don’t know whether that is 
a concern to anybody.
(GS): Should you only concentrate on the output or
the process or should you concentrate on the process as well 
as the results?
(JR): It comes back to the concentration on stewardship.
(EH): It seems to me that here is a place where your
Commission, Mr. Chairman, can make a very substantial contri­
bution... (MFC: That is what I'm afraid of.) ...among other 
places, and that place is to find a way to communicate to 
people the extent to which it can reasonably be expected that 
financial statements are predictive and the extent to which 
it cannot be expected. (MFC: I accept the suggestion.) Now 
I have been troubled, as perhaps your comments indicate that 
you have been, by the SEC'S blithe comments about predictability
(MFC): Well, I didn't mean to express a view. (EH: I'm 
disappointed.) I merely intended to bring to everyone’s 
attention again that we are living in a real world. But it is 
a moving world, and the rules seem to change all the time.
And yet, all that raises some basic question as to the role— 
those are hackneyed words already—but the role and the 
responsibilities and, as someone suggested, possible consequent 
liability.
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(EH): That is the first time that word has been 
used this morning, but I’m glad to hear it come into focus.
Discussion Leader (GB): It is the real world, again, 
in the sense of the efficient market. I am trying to keep 
it directed towards what we are organized for.
(MFC): Or even if some of you around here can persuade 
us that the market’s pretty inefficient.
Discussion Leader (GB): The interesting thing 
about the research is that that is the real world.
There have been many conferences in which people who deal with 
trees are of the assumption that they are looking at the 
forest, and they think that they are looking at the real 
world. The advantage of this research is that in fact it 
has given us a look at the real world, not just a piece of it, 
but a larger part of it, so we could make generalizations. 
Therefore, I suggest that we consider these questions within 
the scope of evidence. What evidence do we have, for example, 
with respect to the questions Josh raised about the possibility 
that management may not have an incentive to disclose information 
and the possibility that people don't know about it? That 
is to say that the market doesn’t react as if it did know about 
it. The fact that it hasn't been disclosed by one person 
doesn't mean it is not known by some. The second thing is, 
what evidence do we have that in fact auditors have done a 
bad job? Are we trying to correct a situation that doesn't
-105-
exist? The fact that you. have got a few cases doesn't mean that 
the world is bad. Or the fact that you have a few cases 
doesn’t mean that it is worth trying to correct it.
(JR): Unfortunately, it is empirically very difficult
to find out whether information for which there is no 
incentive for management to produce was obtained from
alternative sources or not. .
(RK): There is a study, the Collin's study on circum­
stantial evidence, that suggested that (a) information within 
the firm that was relevant to price-setting behavior gave 
better predictive behavior about the stock prices and (b) was 
not disclosed.
(JR): And (c) that it was extremely weak.
(DRC): We are going to have to break for lunch. Chuck, 
you indicated a desire to comment.
(CW): I really wanted to come back to the point that
Ernie made about 15 minutes ago, which I suspect in listening 
to the conversation around the table kind of got missed.
His point was that putting out a descriptor about procedures 
takes you only just so far. There is going to be some point 
reached where we put information on these financial statements 
that is so irrelevant that it won’t have any effect. Academicians 
will be able to study that 20 years from now and prove that 
it didn’t have an effect. For example, we might get information 
such as the eye color of the top executives of the company, 
which I think is probably about as relevant, George, to
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decision-making in the stock market, as whether Susie Q and 
Mary X in the cash disbursement function are separated one 
from the other, which I take it from hearing your remarks 
is part of the kind of thing you would have us put in, 
descriptors, not evaluators. I don’t think anybody is 
going to be able to do a thing with that kind of information. 
Five, ten years from now we will be able to prove that.
(JR): The point is that financial statements do have
an effect.
(DRC): Well, Bob.
(RH): I would just like to make a comment in connection
with Joshua's and his neighbor’s comment earlier and Mr. Cohen’s 
response. It seems to me that you are saying that these ideas 
about looking at the resource allocation process are too grand.
(MFC): I didn't mean to suggest that.
(RH): Okay, then let me say that I think you do need 
to very carefully consider the effects of your Commission's 
work on the social institution and on the way the incentives 
are placed.
(MFC): Let me assure you that we are certainly 
paying what I hope will be a reasonable amount of attention 
to that problem. I want to emphasize that I am trying to stir 
up some real controversy, and I think I have. I would like
to continue it.
(RH): The reason I raised that was not to say that what
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you had said was wrong. I feel that the reason we are having 
trouble when we bring up the issue of whom we are reporting 
to, the stockholders or the audit committee, is that we 
haven’t really addressed the basic question of what will be 
taken care of through the private enterprise system by 
incentives to produce information and what is going to be 
taken care of through the more public kind of system which 
is enforced upon the auditors through the courts. In that 
context, I think that this difference in having confidence 
in management advisory services but then asking If we should 
judge effectiveness shows that the private system has worked 
pretty well.
(MFC): I understand what you are saying, and I
accept it. I hope you won’t think that I'm irreverent if I 
say to you that I started out as an economist and that someone
wiser than I directed me to law school.
*********
LUNCHEON BREAK
*********
Chairman (DRC): We still have some questions to pursue. 
I did want to pursue the last two items in George’s outline, 
but before we get to those, we should probably consider the 
subject of fraud detection, which, as Bob Kaplan was observing, 
hasn't been discussed too much. We could assume from that that
everyone has accepted it and felt that there was no need for
discussion.
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(RK): I at least wanted to raise this issue when
George was saying it was obviously a function of the auditor 
to try to show when the managers are in effect using the 
resources of the company for their own personal gain, for 
example, the embezzlement of cash. I, at least, just wanted 
to say that the issues can easily get a lot less clear than that, 
because you have the question of company purchase of membership 
in social clubs, the use of chauffeured limousines, and 
company airplanes, and many other perquisites of office. At 
what point does the auditor decide that that kind of thing is 
an excessive compensation to the managers, improper use of 
company resources by the management and therefore on the 
borderline of perhaps fraud and not carrying out the stewardship 
function of management? When it is out-and-out stealing, 
actually taking the cash home and falsifying the records, then 
maybe the issue is more clearcut. So, how much are we willing 
to spend to find that at a basically immaterial level? That 
is the question we should address. Once you commit yourself 
to a policy of looking at things like that, it seems that you 
get into the determination of executive compensation with all of 
its perquisites.
(WN): Well, in the one case there is some kind of 
disclosure required, but in the other case, i.e. fraud, every 
effort is made to conceal it. I think that that becomes a 
fairly sharp distinction in what you are looking for. In the
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first case, maybe the purposes per se don’t get disclosed,
but management contracts that provide a lot of extra benefits 
have to be disclosed today in the proxy statements. The stockholders 
can make a judgment on it if they choose to do so. I don’t 
think the auditor has to make a judgment on it. But in fraud 
there is a real effort to conceal that.
(DS): Disclosure isn’t the end of the story. What is 
the position of the auditor in the recent Lockheed situation 
where officers of the company who were virtually dismissed 
from office for dereliction of duty received ten-year consultancy 
contracts for $70,000 a year? That information has been disclosed; 
it is not a secret. Is the auditor responsible for seeing 
that the company get value for Its money? I just asked that as 
a question; I don’t know the answer.
(KJ): Let’s get away from the Lockheed situation, which 
is sort of a hypothetical question.
(DS): That isn’t hypothetical.
(KJ): Oh, I think it is.
(CW): He wants to address it as hypothetical.
(DS): That’s too difficult for me.
(WN): Let’s take Lockheed for a minute; I think 
that it is interesting. The question now is, do they do 
anything of value for the company in return for the $75,000 
a year?
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(CW): Yes, they get the hell out of there; that is 
what they do that is of value.
(RK): That’s called "exit value.”
(LL): Are you suggesting that the auditor should be 
not only a policeman but also a judge? I don't see how he 
can do that.
(DS): I don’t see how either. But it seems to me that
there is a need for the stockholders to be informed as to 
whether the payment of $70,000 is for something or nothing.
(LL): That must have been the disclosure you talked
about.
(EH) : Don’t they know that?
(DS): The disclosure was that they were getting 
$70,000 a year for ten years as consultants. It doesn’t say 
anything about what they do.
(CW): But nothing will happen anyway, will it? It is 
reported in the latest filings of Rapid American, to pick 
another one, that the Chairman of the Board, Ricklis, took a 
$555,000 fee for the disposition of Playtex, a corporation 
which they just happened to have owned. Now, is that fee fair? 
Should he have receive it? Suppose I were the auditor for that 
company, how would I judge that? In what contexts? Against 
what norms? I guess I could study Marcus Aurelius, Plato 
(voice: Winston Churchill)—But what?
(DS): Why are these all Western writers that you are
studying?
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(EH): Omar Khayyam?
(JR); Omar Khayyam? Well, that is an existentialist; 
that is alright.
(WN): Let’s take Lockheed. Now, they may have a 
consulting contract that may he specified so that the auditor 
can verify that they performed according to the contract, 
whatever that might he. Or let’s say that they were required— 
or did—in fact show up at the office a certain number of 
days a year or to submit proposals on one thing or another 
or to attend conferences. If they didn’t do any of those things 
and they were supposed to, you might say that the company 
wasn’t getting enough value. But let's say that they did do 
those things, on a sort of a pro forma basis, then the auditor 
has a difficult job to evaluate whether or not that kind of 
time resulted in any real value to the company. I don't think 
the auditors can do that. He can determine whether certain
motions were gone through to have a nominal compliance, but he 
can’t make a judgment as to whether their input was worthwhile 
or not, really.
(RK): I hate to keep coming back to this, but isn’t 
that a function of the board of directors to determine whether
they are getting value for what they receive and not the role 
of the auditor?
(KJ): But the Board may never see the contract.
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(EH): Who doesn't see the contract?
(KJ): The board of directors.
(RK): They should. Who is giving them the contract?
(EH): They could if they wanted to.
(JR): But what about outside directors and the audit 
committee?
(WN): Well—the auditors—the Board would certainly 
know about those contracts.
(KJ): Oh, they would know about it, but I wonder— 
just in a hypothetical way—I wonder, how many business contracts 
the board of directors gets into in the ordinary case? They 
don’t see that many; I don't think that they do.
(CW): No, in that case, there is a pattern;' I agree 
with that. But in this particular kind of contract, they 
would surely know what the contract called for.
(KJ): I would think so.
(JR): It is a question of delegation of authority and 
of who should see these contracts and report to the board of 
directors.
(WN): But in the whole vast activity of Lockheed, no, I 
would agree that they wouldn't see a lot of contracts.
(RK): Let's look at this on a broader basis; let’s 
forget about Lockheed for a moment. You don't ask the auditor 
to make judgments about whether or not the firm gets value for 
its money.
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(WN ): We haven’t in the past. Our question is: Is 
that a future responsibility of the auditor?
(RE): We do in this sense: at least the auditor is 
responsible for finding if the current value of assets is 
less than the carrying value. In the case of buying 
inventory, the company doesn’t get value for its money, in 
theory at least, if the inventory has to be written down to 
what its value is. So, the auditor has to have responsibility 
with respect to a wide variety of assets, at least.
(RK): Human capital is always carried at zero. So, 
that is not a particular problem.
(GS): It seems to me that this is not an auditing 
problem we are addressing. The real question is, when you enter 
in description of ’’consulting services” when this is really a 
deferred compensation plan, that is, what is the proper accounting 
for it way back? No one really believes that a guy gets 
$150,000 or $75,000 for services after he stops being
president. This is merely a deferred compensation plan. The 
question is, what is the proper accounting originally for plans 
of this sort? That goes way back; it is an accounting problem.
(CW): That problem has been resolved, George. It is
in the literature.
(GS): Isn't it really a fiction that he is getting
$75,000 for ’’consulting services” that he presently provides?
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(DS): The question is whether disclosing it as 
consulting services is in fact disclosure at all.
(GS): I agree, hut that goes way hack. Originally,
when he signed the contract, you build those things in. What 
is the proper accounting for this essentially deferred compen­
sation?
(WN): How could you provide retroactively in the Lockheed
case?
(GS): Well, I'm not saying you should. I'm saying that 
the original problem is when they entered into the employment 
contract. The question is, how should those deferred compen­
sation situations he accounted for?
(CW): If the rule of the APB Opinion applied, it would
have been accrued over the term of employment to retirement.
(WN): It is just that the term of employment got rather
summarily terminated.
(MS): The original contract in Lockheed didn’t call 
for his dismissal many years before retirement, I think. So, 
we have a unique case, and therefore the normal kind of retire­
ment pay wasn’t implicit. This is a unique situation, which 
David is offering, rather than the typical one, where you have 
built into the original employment contract some notion of 
retirement on some basis with some supposed activity.
(RK): What you are suggesting is that the payments are 
a cost of this period. You take ten years at $70,000 per year
-115-
and reduce the payments to current value, and that is a
cost of the current period.
(MS): Well, David’s question was not accounting for it. 
David’s question was one of injecting a qualitative judgment,
if I read him correctly, and I think we have to separate the 
pure accounting for this on the assumption that it was for ser­
vices given versus before you record it, were there any services?
I think that there is a difference here, and I think we should 
separate them.
(EH): Are we talking here about something that is petty?
(CW): Yes.
(JR): Are you making a distinction between production 
decisions as it reflects the operation of the firm, and infor­
mation production decisions, where the auditor might get 
involved? Or should the auditor really involve himself with 
judgment on operating decisions, such as, "are you getting 
your money's or worth value?” Or is he restricted or, rather, 
do you view his objective as restricted to information on 
information? That is, how reliable is the information, how reliable 
is disclosure, regardless of whether that disclosure reflects' 
bad or good decisions, operating decisions?
(WN): Isn’t our distinction here between the ordinary
operating decision and a contract concerning the top officers 
of the company, where they may have conflicts of interests, 
present and potential?
-116-
(RK): Well, isn’t that an operating decision? We are 
hiring a manager to produce services.
(WN): Yes, but decisions down the line are presumably 
made on an objective basis, whereas when we are involved with 
top management itself, you have conflicts of interests, self- 
serving decisions, that kind of thing. Therefore, it is of 
particular interest to the shareholders.
(RK): But that is exactly the role that the outside
board members play.
(JR): Why not the board of directors and the audit 
committee?
(RK): One of the most important things is that the
compensation of top management of the corporation is a Board 
discretionary item.
(EH): You were saying conflict of interest, conflict 
between whom and whom?
(WN): Why is it then for years that that has been 
required to be disclosed to shareholders if it is entirely a
Board decision?
(RK): They are reporting to the shareholders the results
of their decision.
(LL): If it is a board decision, is your point that
it should be a board decision? My guess is that in the typical 
case of this untypical happening it is. Oh, I have seen it
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happen a number of times, not just with illegal payment. It is 
where, for some reason, the chief executive officer gets 
himself fired by his board and his board, feeling a little bit 
sorry for the action they take, gives him something that 
probably, under the circumstance, he would not be entitled to. 
But in their judgment, this is the best thing for the company, 
to fire him, get rid of him, and give him something which you 
may decide he shouldn’t get. Now, if the board decides it, 
are you raising the question of what is the auditor to do?
(RK): I’m saying it is not the auditor’s role; it is
the Board’s problem.
(JR): It is the auditor's role though to disclose
whatever information he thinks is useful. This is really what
the issue is.
(KJ): The auditor is supposed to comment on the accuracy
of the disclosures that are made by management.
(NN): Disclosures aren’t made by the auditor anyway.
They are made in proxy statements. The Lockheed disclosure was 
made in the proxy statement. The auditor doesn’t audit that.
(CW): But we have another information responsibility 
if we are associated with it. (WN: You do.) Yes, according to 
the SAS, we have to read it, yes. (WN: Is this for proxy type 
information?) You bet. We have got to read it, make sure it is 
there aren’t material misstatements, and make sure that
consistent with the full financial statements.
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(WN): What would you do in this Lockheed case? Would 
you go and examine the contract, for example?
(CW): I don’t know about that one. I probably wouldn’t
have; it is probably not all that material.
(WN): Well, if you are verifying the proxy statement... 
(RK): Nothing in the officers’ compensation is going
to be material for a five-billion dollar corporation. Right?
(CW):Yes, but it probably got my name on the tax return,
which has a schedule.
(WN): It was surely material in the Rapid American case, 
wasn’t it? •
(MFC):I came in here a little late, and I'm sorry about 
that. If you assume that SEC’s proxy rule requirements are based 
on its notion of material information to be provided to investors,
isn’t it material in the context of financial statements?
(LL): No, not necessarily.
(KJ): But that is an accounting question, I think, though. 
(JR): But you can’t really quite separate the accounting
question from the auditing question. It is really quite difficult 
(CW): Do you mean—is it a suggestion—that everything
that an investor needs to know is material for a fair presentation
of financial statements?
(MFC): I didn't say that, I was merely asking a question.
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With respect to the top management, and the rules are
limited to top management because of the position that they 
have and because of potential conflicts, it is the rule— 
whether it is a proper rule or not we can put that aside for a 
moment—it is the rule that you have got to disclose compensation 
(EH: In the proxy statement?) in the proxy statement, okay, 
and there is an obligation on the part of the auditor to 
review the proxy statement if it is accompanied by financial 
statements. Is that right Chuck?
(CW): To read it for material misstatements and
inconsistencies with the financial statements which we audit.
Those two things
(LL): But our review is not from the idea of value
given.
(MFC): Wow, let me ask a more fundamental question 
which you may have already resolved. Did I understand that there 
was some question about whether the engagement letter is 
something that is reviewed by the Board? Ken, did you say that
it is not?
(KJ): Wo, what I said was that there are a lot of 
contracts that are executed by management that never reach the
level of attention of the Board. It seems to me that is is a
matter of some sort of system that produces unusual transactions
for the Board’s review.
(MFC): Let me push along here. Should the engagement 
letter be reviewed by the Board?
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(KJ): Which engagement letter, is this the auditor’s
engagement letter?
(MFC): Yes, the auditor's engagement letter, so the 
Board knows what is expected of the auditor, and what the 
auditor contracts to do, and doesn't do.
(KJ): I don’t know but I certainly think it's a good 
thing to be reviewed by the audit committee.
(MFC): But the audit committee is really a committee 
of the Board. So, you are saying yes.
(EH): I think the point is that it is not a bad idea.
The next question is whether somebody would want to mandate it, 
because this runs to the very question of the right of people 
to contract with people, and under what constraints.
(MFC): I agree with that. I think you are right on 
target and that is the reason for my question. But the Board 
is a representative of the shareholders and as a representative 
of the shareholders contracts with the auditor, the only 
independent person in the whole picture. Then, is it of some 
consequence, at least, to compel that representative to know 
what he is getting and to have some decision with respect to 
what he is to get? If he is not in at that level, how could he 
complain later that I didn't get what I needed from it?
(DRC): Most of the important things that are expected in 
an audit are implicit and not explicit in the engagement letter.
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Most of the important responsibilities are implicit responsibilities 
that are not stated.
(GS): Well, I think maybe that should be made explicit.
(JR): Should it be made explicit?
(MFC): I'm just raising the question here.
 (EH): But, if I could continue, it is not a bad idea, 
and I would see no reason to object to it. The typical 
engagement letter today would say that we contract to report 
on the financial statements, their presentation In accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles. We will consult 
with you on accounting problems if you ask us to. We will do 
whatever it is that we agree that we shall do with respect to 
interim financial statements under ASR 177. And we will do 
certain tax work for you, or we won’t, depending on how it works 
out. And we will do management services consulting, if you ask 
us to, and upon particular further agreement. And that is what 
the typical engagement letter today would say.
(CW): It typically adds a sentence. Most of the firms,
I think, are adding sentences discussing the illegal acts area 
and errors and irregularities, indicating the degree of respon­
sibility that they feel the average audit can cover.
(MFC): That gets very close to the reason for my
question. Would it be a healthy thing if the audit letters 
were reviewed by the audit committee?
(EH): Would you say that again?
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(MFC): Would it be a healthy development if there were 
a rule which requires that the engagement letter be approved 
by the Board, or by its committees?
(EH): Probably.
(JR): Any information reduces uncertainty, I cannot see 
anyone really rationally objecting to that.
(RK): No, that’s not important, Josh. It seems like 
a fundamental responsibility that the audit committee should 
know what is going on in the audit.
(JR): I think that that is precisely right.
(CW): You are not going to learn anything from reading 
an engagement letter.
(RK): Well, maybe we should get better engagement letters.
(WN): Does the engagement letter tell how many subsidi­
aries that you are going to audit?
(CW): No, it doesn’t tell the extent of testing. As a. 
matter of fact, it would be dangerous from an auditing standpoint 
to spell out our procedures, because it would give management 
warning as to how to work around our letter.
(RK): No, that is nonsense.
(WN): That, nevertheless, is the question I’m raising 
here. Let’s say he is interested in getting a budget on the 
audit so he can determine if the cost corresponds with the budget.
(JR): You seem to be saying that the information provided 
in the engagement shouldn’t be disaggregated to the extent that
-123-
would be counter-productive in that management gets a clue as 
to what precisely to avoid.
(CW): I think that is part of it. But I also think that
all ought to look at a typical engagement letter, and I think 
that you would conclude with me that it is fine for the board 
to look at it. First of all, when the audit expenditure might 
be considered immaterial to the Board, it might not be to the 
audit committee. Secondly, they are not really going to learn 
very much from it.
(MFC): That doesn’t answer the question. Maybe they have
an obligation to learn a lot about it.
(KJ): Manny, are you asking the question of who engages 
the auditor? I’m just trying to identify the cause of your
concern.
(MFC): That question is involved in it, Ken. I wasn’t 
limiting the question, but I assume that that would come up in 
the discussion.
CHAIRMAN (DRC): It seems we are dealing with form rather 
than substance. Perhaps we should get back to the substance. The 
real question that we seem to be looking for, when we started the 
discussion, was not so much whether the auditor should or shouldn’t 
be responsible for something, but how do we decide? And what is it 
that distinguishes the fact that management is getting a certain 
amount of compensation called consulting fees that might not 
really be consulting fees or the company is not getting value for
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the money? What distinguishes that from stealing? We all
seem to agree that stealing is something the auditor should 
he concerned with call attention to. The real question is, what 
is the dividing line, how do you make the dividing line more 
than what falls on which side of the line?
(GS): In that regard, in our meeting two weeks ago on 
materiality—not materiality, although it Is related—on the 
audit committee, one of the things, Manny, that we were talking 
about there was, should—the audit committee presumably hires 
the auditors—should there be some discussion or some agreement 
as to the level of—I hate to say materiality—but the level 
of accuracy, precision, and so on, that will be exercised in the 
audit process? Obviously, there is a cost-benefit situation 
there, right. Who is to determine, within broad professional 
guidelines, how narrowly or how precisely the audit process is
to go? What is the desired cost-benefit relationship? Should 
that be something that the audit committee, Manny, be knowledgeable 
about? What is the desired level of precision, what is the cost, 
and so on? And how do you get some communication about that?
(EH): George, it seems to me that you are raising a 
question that ought to be answered by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board. That group has—well, you shrug your shoulders 
and sigh —but nevertheless that group has before it a project 
on materiality. What you have raised is really the very question 
of that project of theirs. It would seem to me that a particular
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audit committee of a particular board of directors would not 
want to have, once the FASB issues a statement, a different 
level of precision in its statements. Would not want to have— 
would not want to work towards—a different level of precision 
than that level which is generally understood to be the acceptable 
level for all companies.
(GS): That is not clear, Mr. Hicks. It seems to me that
maybe if the FASB works, that this will have a floor. An audit 
committee may desire a higher level or lower—you could always 
argue which it is. I'm not sure, by the way, what the appropriate 
adjective is. In other words, that it may want to have a greater 
confidence than the minimum confidence that- is required by the 
materiality standards which are imposed by the FASB. It is 
conceivable and I’m saying that at least this came out from our
discussion.
(MFC): Let me put it in the context of a particular 
situation. In one of the very early cases involving foreign 
payments after we had marched the individuals into the special 
prosecutor's office, and they had taken their pleas, it was my 
feeling that the SEC ought to be put in possession of the relevant 
facts as promptly as possible. So the pleas were taken in the 
morning, and in the afternoon we were in Stanley Sporkin’s office. 
We indicated that the company intended to make an appropriate 
investigation, and how it was to be done, and so on. This was 
almost by way of a model of what happened later. But one of 
the questions put to me was: Who were the auditors that are
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going to be involved? You can’t do this yourself. I said "well, 
the regular independent auditors.” The answer was: ”My God, 
they missed the boat!”
(EH): By whose definition did they miss what boat?
(MFC): That is part of the real world. What I’m saying 
is this: a lot of things have happened since this explosion of 
Watergate and the consequent investigations, and so on, and I 
think whether this is accepted because everybody thinks it is 
appropriate or whether it is accpeted for other reasons, audit 
committees have become very sensitive to this issue. It seems 
to me that if that is a fact, that is a true fact, then the audit 
committee ought to be the body that decides what the independent 
auditors should produce for their benefit.
(EH): That is a matter of contract. I have no problem
with that.
(LL) : Manny, to me you have twisted this a little bit. We 
seem to be talking about the responsibility of the audit committee 
rather than the responsibility of the auditor, and maybe we should 
get into it. If you want to talk about responsibility of the 
audit committee, talk about something important, not audit 
our audit program. I don’t think they really select the auditors;
I think they carry out management’s wishes. I don’t think the 
stockholders select the auditors. And if you really want to get 
into something sensitive, if that audit committee, independent
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of management, could say who the auditors were going to he, maybe 
you have made a first step at arriving at something.
(MS): I would like just to inject something on this one 
point. The view at the meeting two weeks ago was that while 
historically the situation was as you described it, the movement 
was in a direction that they would stand on their hind legs and 
say "we, the audit committee designate the auditor—no matter 
what you, the rest think—we will press and stand up on our legs 
and insist." So I think it. is an evolving kind of change.
(LL): I think that would be good.
(MFC): Lee just said, that is good. It would seem to me 
that would afford a measure of protection to the independent 
auditor that he does not have now.
(MS): Yes, it is two ways. Can I just offer one question here 
Now, just on this point, there are two issues here, and I think 
they should be separated. The first is the formal engagement 
letter, and the second is the subsequent discussion of specifics.
Now, would it be fair to say that the engagement letter, as I 
heard, is a rather short document with no extensive exposition 
on where and how you go about the job? Therefore, its utility 
to an audit committee would be nominal, and it would be fair to 
suggest, that before very long we have a standard engagement letter 
which is uniform in the profession. But the real key is the 
level of exchange between the auditor and the audit committee, once
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the engagement letter is in and the specifics are spelled out 
by this exchange. Because in discharging their role as audit 
committee members, they are vitally concerned with the depth 
to which one goes, the extent of the audit, so that they can 
respond and worry about the internal audit system and get 
involved. So, you really have two levels, which suggests that 
a requirement that this engagement ' letter be reviewed by the 
Board is no great requirement because it doesn’t say anything
in the first instance.
(JR): But it can be specific as to responsibilities 
but not necessarily as to procedures.
(MS): Well, it is just like the standard certificate.
Okay, we have it, now let’s forget that and get down to essentials.
(CW): Can I speak? I can’t be very specific as to 
responsibilities, because I want to tell you that I am not going to 
commit, in advance, the responsibility I’m going to take in my 
audit report letter on those financial statements, until I’ve 
done an audit and then I will tell them. Believe me, I’m not 
prepared to take any responsibility before that.
(MFC): Let me rephrase this, Chuck, in a way that I would
like even better. You are a professional, and therefore you can’t 
be bound by any such arrangement to the extent to which you act as 
a professional. That I understand and I accept in you. But I 
think that is not the point.
(KJ): Let me just go on here. First, we are talking
-129-
about a separate standard or measure of morality executed by 
the auditor along the lines of the Lockheed case. The second 
thing, Manny, is that you are bringing out that the audit 
committee ought to have the responsibility in fact to engage the 
auditor instead of endorsing management’s pre-selection.
(MFC): It is a fairly simple proposition I’m proposing.
(KJ): On the question of what the auditor does with
the contract, my guess is—I don’t know anything about the 
company that we are talking about—is that the contract says that 
Mr. X will hold himself available for consultation and it is the 
act of making himself available, agreeing to consult if asked, 
that he is being paid for. What we are struggling with is, how do 
we distinguish one act which is going to be criticized, that is 
stealing, from another act which is going to get some sort of 
acceptance by the stockholders, such as these consulting arrange­
ments? I think the point of distinction is that the auditor 
should perceive the cutoff point from the standpoint of the 
shareholder, since that is the person to whom we are reporting 
indirectly. The shareholder will take objection to some action 
by management, and clearly in this case, because there was 
disclosure and the stockholders did not react, that must be 
acceptable to them as a means of either providing some sort of 
deferred benefit or some other recompense to the people that 
have been discharged. And that is really what our cutoff point
is in these sorts of cases.
(CW): Except, you know that that is not true, either. You
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know that proxy solicitation results in an automatic vote for 
management’s actions. You know that people don’t think these 
things through, and you know that these things are automatically 
ratified and, indeed, that the democratic challenging process 
really doesn’t work.
(RK): But you want the auditors in a position of challenging
that system and saying, "stockholders you are doing a dumb thing."
(CW): I’m not the one suggesting that we make all these
normative judgments.
(LL): There is a point at which your head, your judgment
and your stomach being weak can’t take it anymore, and you might 
just step in and do something. I have seen it.
(DRC): The purpose, at least, the conventional wisdom on 
proxy disclosure of things like compensation is the moderating 
influence. It is not based on the presumption that shareholders 
will scrutinize that data and pass on it, as agreeing with it or 
not. But the mechanism of disclosing it will itself exert a 
moderating influence. If that doesn't work and if It gets really 
out of bounds, then people will really stand up and scream.
(GS): Let me ask a question that has always bothered me 
about this requirement. You require disclosure of compensation 
in situations where there are potential conflicts of interest.
Is that right?
(MFC): It doesn’t go quite that far but it moves in that
direction.
(GS): Okay, what is the auditor's responsibility, if any,
when compensation takes a form, so that it cannot be quantified
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namely, stock options, deferred compensation, and so on, where 
there really is no way to quantify that kind of thing?
(EH): Options have to he reported in the proxy statement
in the same section as officers’ compensation.
(RH): That is not the thing that is difficult. It is
the use of company aircraft, the use of company suites at the 
Regency, all these kinds of resources that is the stuff that 
is hard to quantify. Stock options are simple.
(JR): Stock options can’t he quantified, hut limousines 
can he disclosed as a fact without quantifying the price.
(GS); How do we presently quantify stock options, I mean 
the compensation involved in terms of them?
Chairman (DRC): Can we throw out the accounting question 
and move on.
(RK): It is 10,000 shares at this list price and you use
whatever option pricing model you want to use to determine the
value of that.
Chairman (DRC): Before we leave George's outline, I would 
like to try to touch on his last two questions. Could you read 
us those, George?
Discussion Leader (GB): Yes, the third one is: What 
is the rationale that supports or rejects requirements imposed 
on private corporation that govern the extent of audits? The 
first question under that is: Would the optimal amount of
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auditing be achieved without requirements being imposed by 
governmental or private authority? The second is: If not, 
what are the relevant externalities and utility maldistributions 
Let me just explain the last part, because I put it in somewhat 
technical terms or at least in my jargon. I just have to say 
that normally there are only three reasons why government 
should intervene in private affairs, other than the fact that 
they rather enjoy the exercise or that is the individuals 
involved in personally accomplishing it enjoy it.
(MFC): I think that is biased.
Discussion Leader (GS): I think that is not biased; it 
is a statement of fact.
(MFC): I think that that is the end of the argument. 
Discussion Leader (GB): I think that to some people—
power is obviously something that interests a lot of people, and 
they usually go into positions where they can exercise power. 
They become tenured professors or a variety of other things.
(JR): As Kissinger said, it is the best aphrodisiac. 
Discussion Leader (GB): Yes, alright, in any event,
that is another confession. By externalities—I said three 
reasons—one is an externality, neighborhood-something that . 
Josh has mentioned a variety of times, and others have—namely 
a corporation may not provide information to the shareholders 
because it doesn’t benefit those groups of shareholders that 
cannot gamer the total benefits of the information but others 
benefit from it. So, they have an interest in seeing that it is
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produced. Society as a whole may have an interest in seeing to it that 
Lockheed doesn’t bribe officials in Japan, because this affects 
foreign relations we have with Japan, while Lockheed may be 
perfectly within their private costs to do this. That is an exter­
nality, external costs or benefits that can't be gathered 
entirely by the people involved in making the decisions. That 
is a rationale for doing it.
The second rationale is its efficiency, namely the government 
is beleived to be the most efficient purveyor or mover of the 
information, more so than the private sector and more so than any 
private organization, like Standards & Poors or Moody's or somebody 
else. The last is the matter of value judgments. You say, look,
I think it is inequitable that in such a situation that private 
corporations operate in a certain way or that there is a maldistribu­
tion of—I view it as income—maldistribution of something which we 
consider valuable, utilities is a sort of catch-all word for that.
For example, we think that we ought to have a redistribution of 
medical services to the poor, even though they can’t afford it, 
because we think that is a good thing. That is our value judgment.
Now, you have to postulate one of those three things before 
you can argue that it is a useful thing for the government to 
intrude itself. One has to say, well, where are they? My feeling is 
that there aren’t any maldistributions of utility involved here. You 
want the poor to own stock, you give them stocks, and so I think we
-134-
can give them disclosure. The efficiency question and the ex­
ternalities question one has to at least identify. We can’t 
measure them very well.
The other question then is, how much is enough? When do 
you get to the point—this again necessarily drives us hack to 
the essential question that Bob Elliott will be talking about, 
namely, what are the cost-benefit tradeoffs here? But maybe 
first you have to postulate at least there is some benefit, 
because you know there are costs. If you can't identify any 
benefits, well then we can forget about it because we know the 
costs are there. If you can identify benefits then you have to
ask: are those benefits sufficient to offset the cost? Who pays
for it? Who benefits? Clearly, I think it is a good idea, that 
there is a benefit, if I get $1,000 a week from some unnamed
source, or named source, for that matter. Since the cost is to
somebody else, there is a redistribution of wealth from them to 
me. I think that is a good thing, but they may think it is a 
bad thing. At least we have to say there is some benefit going 
on and we ought to identify it.
The last question is—what the efficient market tells us— 
is that, at least so far as publicly-traded corporations are 
concerned, a lot of the information that otherwise might be 
provided by auditors is apparently ferreted out by people in
their own self-interest. It seems that at least the evidence is
consistent with that belief.
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(JR): It is also consistent with the other belief that it 
is not efficient.
Discussion Leader (GB): No, I don’t believe it is. You 
keep citing that there are cases, and I would like to get the 
references because I don’t know about them. I just reviewed 
all this literature for a book I just finished. Unfortunately, 
the book is obviously flawed because I don’t know of this 
evidence that Josh has. But even without that, we have questions 
about corporations or partnerships that aren’t traded.
Is there a governmental interest in this? And the last question, 
of which I personally think there is an interest, and that is, 
in enterprises where there is no market constraint, namely the 
government itself. What is New York City doing with the resources 
entrusted to it? What is TVA doing with the resources entrusted 
to it?
I'm in the middle of a project in which I have written away
to all the Federal agencies and asked them, would they please 
send me their quarterly reports and annual statements and tell 
me who their auditor is. And I got back a whole—I knew what 
I was doing, I didn't send it on my university stationery—most of 
them answered, some of them didn't; most of them don't produce 
any statements worth a damn. The SEC statement comes out 11 months 
after the end of their fiscal year, which violates the regulations 
they impose on corporations, and I have no choice but to buy a 
share in them. As a citizen, I own them. I can clearly decide 
not to buy General Motors or anyone else if I don't like them.
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I wonder what the responsibility of the AICPA, as representative 
of the public interest, is in situations where the governmental 
bodies are not following ordinary rules of reporting to their 
constituents.' So those are the general questions.
(WN): May I start the last one back. First of all, with 
regard to governmental units, I think you are overlooking the 
fact that there is a market interest in it, if you happen to 
be bondholders rather than equity holders. And bondholders 
are today becoming quite concerned about the financial position 
of certain municipalities. So I think the market factor does 
operate on—it doesn't operate on the SEC, the case you cited— 
but it operates on all the vast number of municipalities and 
revenue units, that kind of thing.
(MFC): I would like to interrupt here. I suppose George
could say it operates on the SEC, too, because pressure would 
be brought on the Appropriations Committee.
(WN): I mean there are no bondholders in the SEC.
Discussion Leader (GB): Well, then we might get into
the question of conflict of interest, between the Appropriations 
Committee and the people to whom they are appropriating funds 
and what those people do to the specific members of those committees 
from which they get their funds. But I’m sorry, I shouldn’t 
have interrupted what you were saying.
(WN): Well, that was just a minor point.
Discussion Leader (GB): That is a good point.
(WN): I think that we do have a market factor operating,
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and I think it is going to operate more vigorously in
the future than it has in the past. But looking to the
broader question of how do you determine how much
•auditing we should have, how much expenses we should
have, I would like to throw out this proposition: a company 
will spend or should spend as much money on an audit as required 
to maintain its credibility in the public sector, with all the 
different kinds of pressures that bear upon it. It needs to 
maintain its credibility in order to maintain some freedom of 
action. The amount of auditing that will enable it to do that 
can not be determined with any one point in time, except by 
the general observation of what the community demands are, 
whether they are rational or irrational. Now, for example, 
today, we are having demands to know what all these illegal 
payments are. You know that they are really immaterial from a 
financial standpoint, but somehow they are perceived to be 
important from some other standpoint. So, corporations have to 
provide information today on a special basis, but I would suggest 
that maybe they are going to have to provide this information 
on a recurring basis. If this requires more audit expense, so 
be it. Now, that is a hypothesis. I would like to hear reactions
to it.
(MFC): You asked the question demands from whom? There 
are at least two bills in the Congress right now, one introduced
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by Senator Proxmire and a much more sophisticated piece just 
introduced by Senator Church. The assumption is that those 
bills are introduced by members of the Congress in response 
to some public demand. I don’t know if I have any empirical 
evidence to prove that to you, but theoretically, that is how 
these people operate. That is the answer to your question.
(CW): There is a public demand that we know about to some 
extent. There is a brief that has been filed before the SEC by 
the National Council of Churches in connection with the illegal 
acts area. Presumably, that has led to some of Hill’s remarks 
and, I think, led directly to the way that Senator Church's 
legislation is phrased.
(MFC): The President of the United States thinks that 
the matter is important.
(JR): I agree with George that it has to boil down to,
at least on the theoretical level, to some issue of externality 
or social welfare criteria, which George calls utility maldis­
tributions. But I think that probably most of the demands can be 
rationalized, on one of these bases or the other. I think that 
what we are arguing with George, is that it is not necessary 
for these benefits to be quantified and measured prior to taking 
action, because it is very difficult to measure these benefits, 
as Bob Elliott is probably well aware of since he has been 
involved in the social measurement project. It s not clear to
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me that, one identifies the benefit but is unable to 
empirically measure them, that that is not a justification 
for coming up with a set of requirements, given a certain 
concensus about the political process. Because it is one 
thing to say that the benefits probably can be identified 
but unless I can measure them, since there are some positive 
costs, I shouldn’t take that action. I don’t think that is 
justified because there is an equally forceful argument to 
the contrary. There are identifiable benefits; I cannot 
measure them. There are some positive costs, but that, you 
know, it may imply some actions.
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Discussion Leader (GB): Well, I admit, I'm taking what 
I think is a value judgment, and I don't justify it on any 
other basis. The value judgment essentially is that in a free 
society (I hope it doesn't grate anyone’s ears. I would think 
it would fall lightly on those ears*) in a free society, citizens 
are better off making decisions for themselves and not having 
them being made for them. Unless somebody can...and therefore if 
you are not sure what to do, if you are not sure whether arresting 
all women between 34 St. and 67 St. on the West Side will reduce 
prostitution, and reducing prostitution is a good thing, then 
civil liberties says you don't do that sort of thing. Now, if 
you are not sure what to do, you take the action that does not 
impose upon the liberties of people. I'm saying, if we don't 
know what the benefits are, or can't measure them, we don’t 
impose costs on people. That is a bias, I admit.
(JR): But, you see, that is precisely what doesn’t follow 
for me that if the benefits cannot be accurately measured...
Discussion Leader (GB): I didn’t say accurately, Josh— 
you keep saying that—I said measured at all.
(LL): Can we get it out of the theoretical? I think
that we are not ready for Items 1 and 2 yet. When we begin to 
run out of energy, and begin to run out of scarce materials, then 
I think you are going to get Items 1 and 2, but I have to believe 
that the auditing process will be geared in with allocation of 
resources only when we become desperate and that is a long 
way off. As to Item I think we are there now. I didn't go up
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to New York, so I can’t speak of New York, but in Pennsylvania, 
many of these municipalities, authorities, school districts, 
are being audited, many of them by independent public accountants. 
But where they are not they have got—in the law—they have 
got the butcher and the baker and the candlestick maker being 
the appointed auditors and they are making some kind of an audit. 
But most subdivisions of the state are being audited, not the 
state itself.
(RE): That is fiscal auditing, now, and I think the
particular type of accountability that is needed there might be 
more in terms of the delivery of the social services that the 
government unit is supposed to be delivering. And that gets 
back to Bill's point about whether bondholders are going to hold 
these people to account. What happens is—you see it here in 
New York, for example—the bondholders are in effect running the 
city to maximize the probability that the bonds will be paid 
rather than to deliver the social services that some people 
expect of the city.
(RK): Secular corporations, when they go into bankruptcy,
the corporation is run to recover the money for the debtors and 
it is generally in the best interests of the corporation and the 
stockholders not to allow a situation to get them into bankruptcy,
-141-
Just like it was in the best interests of the recipients of 
services in New York not to demand a level of services that 
would put them into a situation where they were no longer 
running the city.
(EH): Mr. Chairman, could I rise to a point of order, 
please? Can I ask somebody to tell me what the subject is 
right at this point.
Chairman (DRC); I am afraid that I lost track.
(LL): Roman numeral TV, Item 3.
(EH): I Just wanted to see if the Chairman knew.
Chairman (DRC): I failed that test.
(RK): Seems like we are getting to Roman numeral IV 
without having gotten into Roman numeral III.
Discussion, Leader (GB): Let me suggest one thing on 
Roman numeral III. The point here is that if you look back 
before we had any kind of requirement, you see that there was 
auditing being done. And if you think about what the interests 
of private parties are, there is an interest in having an auditor
check on the behavior of the steward. Even in a situation where-—
go back a minute—a corporation is being formed, the people who 
are the promoters of that corporation know that they have an 
agency problem. Will the people who are running the corporation 
run it in the interests of the owners? The answer is, of course 
they won’t, not entirely, and there is a monitoring problem.
How do you know whether they are doing it, whether they are not 
running it in their own benefit, ripping it off for their benefit,
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or they are going to run it in the owner's interests? We know 
no one runs anything in the interest of somebody else, entirely. 
There is always their own self-interest operating. So, 
auditors came into the game very early. Go hack to the history 
of auditing. They came into the game with the bondholders in 
England, checking on their investments in the United States, 
sending first Price Waterhouse auditors over to check on what 
was happening with their money. And if you go back much earlier, 
of course, you find the same thing. Now, given that, the 
question I was raising is why would not these private parties, 
operating in their own self-interest, arrive at the optimal amount 
of auditing? By optimal I mean that an additional dollar spent 
on auditing would not give you a dollar's return on getting better 
performance from the manager in the interests of the owners.
(MFC): Let me raise a question. I don’t want to prolong 
the discussion. This started as you say, a long time ago when you 
were dealing with a finite, relatively small group, at least 
those who had it within their power to take action or at least
to arrive at a decision whether to take or not to take action.
It has been suggested that with the development of the corporation 
and the spread of the separation of ownership and management, that 
you have a different problem. You do have owners who are not 
capable of exercising the function of owners as it was when auditing 
first started. Do you think that changes the situation?
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Discussion leader (GB): I don't believe so, because 
when anyone buys a share of a corporation, you know, you 
buy it under conditions in which you can’t physically look 
out. One of the major functions, I believe, that auditing firms 
have is that they stand as independent parties who will look 
out for the interests of the shareholders vis a vis the managers 
and, in fact, report upon them as to whether the contractual 
arrangements are being maintained.
(RK): They can’t do that and finally they have their own
self-interest. The auditor is also an interested party.
Discussion Leader (GB): Right, and I’m suggesting that 
their self-interest lies, and I believe always has been, in doing 
their job well, because what an accountant really sells, I 
believe, is his integrity and the accountant has a lot to lose 
in not doing his job well
(JR): But it is so true that any individual investor who
wants to seek information about the uncertainty of the information 
that is disclosed to him, if anyone were to do that, he would 
have to seek some sources. It would Involve costs; presumably 
he would in a free enterprise—completely free—system, presumably 
he could do that or he could not do that, depending on his own 
perception of costs and benefits. I think that there is still an 
externality problem in the social function of providing information 
that reduces the uncertainty of disclosures. It may well be that 
the optimal social arrangement is to have auditors fulfill that
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function and that will not evolve simply as a result of pursuing 
self-interest on the part of both parties involved.
(RK): Let me just try to say it a different way, because 
I am really astonished to even make this argument.
(LL): Are you on privately or publicly held companies 
at the moment?
(RK): Publicly held.
(LL): I thought we were on Items 3 and 4 of the outline, 
which is on privately held companies.
(RK): No, we are on private corporations that are 
publicly traded.
George, that you can sit there and use classical economic 
analysis on a good which is a public good like information is 
really surprising. It is obvious that when I don’t count your 
own benefits from the information, because information is a public 
good and it goes to people other than the people who directly pay for 
it, then it just almost follows immediately that I will invest less 
to get that information than is socially optimal.
Discussion Leader (GB): I think that you have a fallacy 
in the meaning of ’’public good” in this particular case.
(JR): No, no, I think, that if you analyze situations 
that there are clear incentives to suppress negative information.
(RK): It is clear that that is why you have under Investment 
in R&D, and why you have government interference in subsidizing,
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perhaps, R&D because the people who pay for that don't
capture all the benefits in the R&D. It goes to their competitors, 
and it goes to the economy as a whole. So, that is what 
Josh has been calling an externality, but basically it is 
that you don’t capture all the benefits in your investment.
Discussion Leader (GB): Let me ask you this 
question, Bob. Say, you are a shareholder in General 
Motors, and you get an audit report that says, ”we have 
examined the books of account, etc.” To what extent is 
that information not totally captured by you as a shareholder.
You can now sell your shares to somebody else who is likely to 
buy them, and you are fully aware that they are buying with the 
knowledge of some information.
(RK): But nonshareholders get it too, and they can 
decide not to buy it.
Discussion Leader (GB): That is the advantage, but 
if nonshareholders were to get no information, that is 
information.
(JR): But, George, that doesn’t follow.
Discussion Leader (GB): Are you likely to be able 
to sell your shares in a company that does not produce audit 
reports?
(MFC): Yes, there is another theory. I’m just 
trying to clarify here...
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(RK): No, George, you are not saying zero or the 
current level of auditing. I am trying to find out what 
the optimal level of auditing is. I’m saying that, because 
it is a. public good and because the people who pay for it 
don’t capture all of the benefits from that service, you 
get less overall investment in that good than is desired 
in the economy.
(JR): I think it is clear, if you analyze it, that 
there is a clear incentive to suppress negative information 
and nothing that free enterprise will do will prevent that 
from happening without some kind of interference.
(MSh) : Also, George, it is not clear, even if you 
talk about the level of auditing being influenced by the 
stockholders, it is not clear—the mechanism isn't clear— 
by which they do that. If all stockholders could get 
together and form a coalition and then in a game sense, game 
theory sense, could exert their influence against the other 
parties, that would be one thing, but stockholders are very 
diffuse. It is not clear that in some obscure way the market 
mechanism operates to deliver for them what they in fact 
could theoretically deliver for themselves if they formed 
a coalition, that is if the stockholders formed a coalition, 
which they can't do. So, I just can't buy your argument.
(RK): You can't possibly think about coalition 
formation for stockholders. The idea that they are going to
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sit back and determine the optimal level of auditing when there 
are 300,000 stockholders and the number changes every day. It 
is just not an interesting way of looking at that problem.
(JR); So, you have got to have a social arrangement. 
Chairman (DRC): I will agree with that. Chuck, did
you still want to make your comment?
(CW): George has implicit in the question after Roman
numeral IIi an assumption, which I think we ought to recognize, 
and it is that an audit is the' best way to go about getting the 
benefit we seek, which is to prevent shareholders from being 
hurt by receiving misleading financial Information—financial 
information, which isn’t a lot. They may be hurt for other 
reasons, market actions, and so on. And I think, indeed, that 
fundamental question needs to be addressed. My guess, roughly, 
is that we have about a billion dollars a year of fees that are 
paid to audit public companies in this country, and it would 
appear, not withstanding the size of some of the debacles, that 
that would build a heck of an insurance fund, along the order 
of the SIPC or the FDIC, etc. And it is an interesting thing to 
contemplate, as one who loves his profession and makes his living 
from it, that that might be a better way to go about the ballgame, 
from a cost standpoint.
(LL): We have been through that.
(MFC): It is no-fault insurance.
(LL): Yes, we have gone through that exercise quite 
some time ago.
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(WN): In a little different fashion, namely that the 
auditing firm would he the guarantor or the insurers.
(RK): The incidence of fraud and malfeasance may not
he the same under both institutional arrangements. So, what 
seems like a good insurance fund under the current scheme, may 
not he too good once you get away from that system.
Chairman (DRC): I think that—if it is. fair to say—I 
think that was our general conclusion, that the incidence would 
change, if the mechanism changed, hut I think we should really 
move on to the next subject.
(WN): May I ask one final question? George, you made 
a comment earlier about a shareholder selling his shares to an 
outsider who didn't previously own shares and who didn't have an 
audit. The implication seems to he that he wouldn’t he able to
effectuate the sale because he didn't have an audit.
Discussion Leader (GB): No, he could effectuate the sale 
at a lower price.
(WN): Now, I can't square that with what seems to me to . 
he the implication of your efficient market theory, that the 
auditor’s statement doesn't contribute anything when it is published
Discussion Leader (GB): Let me make that clear. What 
I was saying there, I think, is not that the audited statement 
is meaningless or is not desired. I have written in another 
article that I think the function of the statement is not to 
provide information to people at the time of its publication, but
to provide information that a reputable CPA firm has looked at the
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books of account and, if something was wrong, it would be
published in the financial statements, or some action was 
taken, and although you don’t see it there, you know that they 
have done this and that they are putting their reputation on 
the line. So, in fact, the existence of the financial statements 
is extremely important. At least I think it is important, and 
I take my judgment for that from the fact that financial state­
ments were presented long before they were required by anyone.
The private market caused their creation.
(WN): But in the efficient market theory, why wouldn’t 
it be sufficient, if I follow your line of reasoning, for' the 
auditor to just publish a certificate and forget all the rest.
Discussion Leader (GB): Because the statement itself is 
a more efficient means of establishing the fact that the auditor 
not only did that, but he did something specific. He said: "here 
are the numbers," rather than saying "I just did something."
It is a way of being more explicit about the existence of auditing, 
and also that the financial statement has been—what he is really 
doing is certifying* to use an old term—the existence of that 
statement made by the stewards of the enterprise.
I would just like to very briefly say one thing to end my 
part in the discussion. First of all, I don’t think it was 
worthwhile going on, especially for this group, to the whole 
question of externalities and whether the market would operate 
efficiently if there is a free market for information that is a
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public good. I happen to be working on a paper on that now and 
I will send it to anyone who wants it. Let me say that while 
my colleagues are correct in my opinion, in saying that there 
is some public good aspect, I think they are incorrect in 
saying that it is very important. Also further than that the free 
market, so-called-—I don’t like to use these terms because 
people automatically decide they don’t like it or like it because 
of some prior assumption—is such that you know that you buy 
a share of stock in a company, or anything else, with certain 
expectations that there is going to be some misinformation 
that you are buying at the same time. If you buy a car from a 
dealer, you know that the car isn’t going to be exactly as you 
expected; something is going to be wrong. Usually, the dealer 
stands behind that car, and he gets the business. More business 
comes. Sometimes there is a mistake being made. Some of them 
are cheats; some of them are not. But generally speaking, if 
you look around at a variety of things, I think we see in a wide 
range of aspects that people don’t cheat the public over long 
periods of time just to stay in business.
I think that what the auditor does and it is very important 
to do is to put his integrity on the line and say: "If something 
is wrong here, I’m going to catch it because the reason you are 
hiring me and my name, my firm’s name is behind the statement, is 
because I have a reputation for not knuckling under to management, 
for not allowing numbers that are designed to defraud to get through,
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and for doing the job as is expected of me." I think auditors, 
in fact, do that job, and what we see is an occasional case in 
which they either slip or in which the rules of the game have 
changed somewhere along the line, and they were never paid to 
do something that later was determined that they ought to have 
done in hindsight. So, I think the system has worked before 
quite well and, in fact, works rather well now, and what we have 
mostly is additional costs imposed on the system.
(JR): Only a very brief comment, a brief comment on the
car analogy. It just so happens that the social benefits of cars 
are quite appropriately signalled by the price of cars, including 
the implications of misinformation about cars, whereas this is 
not the case with information, because the social benefits of 
information are not captured through any positive market price 
for information, because it doesn't exist really. And this is 
really what highlights the aspect of the public good nature of 
information. So, if there is any analogy to be made, I don't 
think the car analogy is the best in this case.
Discussion Leader (GB): I don't see the use of carrying 
it on further. All I want to say is. that my silence does not 
indicate assent.
Chairman (DRC): I'm sure you are not the only one who would 
like to make that stipulation.
